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 “We’re going to hold your stock when you hit your quarterly earnings 
target. And we’ll hold it when you don’t. We’re going to hold your stock 
if we like you.  And if we don’t.  We’re going to hold your stock when 
everyone else is piling in. And when everyone else is running for the 
exits.  That is precisely why we care so much about good governance.” 
—	F. William McNabb III, Chairman and CEO of the Vanguard funds 
 
1. Introduction 
While there is considerable evidence that institutional investors influence the governance and 
policies of firms (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013; Brav et al., 2008), this evidence 
primarily focuses on the role of activists that accumulate shares and make demands upon managers or 
active fund managers that exit positions when managers perform poorly.  Yet, such active investors 
represent only a subset of institutions. Many institutions are instead passive in that they do not actively 
buy or sell shares to influence managerial decisions. The investment objective of such institutions is to 
deliver the returns of a market index (e.g., Standard & Poors (S&P) 500) or investment style (e.g., large-
cap value) with low turnover, diversified portfolios, and minimal expenses.  As shown in Fig. 1, passive 
investors have grown significantly in recent years; the share of equity mutual fund assets held in passively 
managed funds tripled over the 1998‒2014 period to 33.5%, and the share of total U.S. market 
capitalization held by passively managed funds quadrupled to more than 8%.  However, the growth of 
passive investors raises questions about how effectively managers are being monitored. Some worry that 
passive investors lack the motives and resources to monitor their large, diverse portfolios, and that the 
increasing market share of such “lazy investors” weakens firm-level governance and hurts performance.1 
Others counter that passive investing does not equate with passive ownership.2  In this paper, we examine 
																																								 																				
1 An example of this viewpoint was expressed in The Economist (2015) on February 7.  As it stated, “A 
rising chunk of the stock market sits in the hands of lazy investors. Index funds and exchange-traded funds mimic 
the market’s movements, and typically take little interest in how firms are run; conventional mutual funds and 
pension funds that oversee diversified portfolios dislike becoming deeply involved in firms’ management.” 
2 For example, the title of this paper, “Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners,” was the title for an article 
written by Glenn Booraem, controller of Vanguard, in April 2013 highlighting the care Vanguard takes when voting 
proxies. See https://personal.vanguard.com/us/insights/article/proxy-commentary-042013. Similar views regarding 
the distinction between being a passive investor, but active owner, were espoused by Rakhi Kumar, head of 
corporate governance at State Street Global Advisors in The Financial Times on April 6, 2014 in an article titled, 
“Passive investment, active ownership,” and by David Booth, chairman and co-founder of Dimensional Fund 
Advisors, in the New York Times on March 16, 2013 (Sommer, 2013) in an article titled, “Challenging management 
(but not the market).” 
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whether passive institutional investors influence firms’ governance structures, and ultimately, 
performance. 
There are various arguments for why the growth of passive investors could weaken the 
governance and performance of firms. First, such institutional investors might lack an incentive to 
monitor managers.  In particular, passive funds seek to deliver the performance of the benchmark, and 
unlike actively managed funds, they have little motive to improve an individual stock’s performance.  
Second, passive investors might be less able to exert influence over managers.  By seeking to minimize 
deviations from the underlying index weights, passive institutions tend to lack a traditional lever used by 
non-passive investors to influence managers—the ability to accumulate or exit positions.  Third, given 
their diversified holdings, passive investors might have insufficient resources to research and monitor the 
corporate policies of each individual firm in their portfolio.  
And yet, there are numerous reasons why the growth of passive investors might improve firms’ 
governance choices and performance. First, passive institutions might be motivated to monitor managers 
and improve overall market performance because this increases the value of their assets under 
management (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).  Moreover, because passive institutions are less willing to 
divest their positions in poorly performing stocks, they might be more motivated than other institutions to 
be engaged owners (Romano, 1993; Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998). Second, institutions that 
manage passive funds can use their sizable ownership stakes to wield influence. All institutional investors 
have a fiduciary duty to vote their proxies in the best interest of shareholders, and managers might be 
more inclined to consider the views of passive investors over more active investors, which tend to exhibit 
higher turnover rates (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). Finally, while passive institutions might lack the 
resources necessary to monitor the detailed policy choices of every firm in their large, diversified 
portfolios, they might be effective at engaging in widespread, but low-cost, monitoring of firms’ 
compliance with what they consider to be best governance practices (e.g., Black, 1992, 1998).   
Identifying the impact of passive investors on firms’ corporate governance and performance can 
be challenging.  Correlations between passive investors and governance choices might not reflect a causal 
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relation since ownership by passive investors might be correlated with factors—such as firms’ investment 
opportunities or ownership by active investors—that directly affect managerial decisions.   
To overcome this challenge and to assess whether passive investors affect firms’ governance and 
performance, we exploit variation in ownership by passive mutual funds that occurs around the cutoff 
point used to construct two widely used market benchmarks, the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes. 
The Russell 1000 comprises the largest 1,000 U.S. stocks, in terms of market capitalization, and the 
Russell 2000 comprises the next largest 2,000 stocks. Because portfolio weights assigned to each stock 
within an index are value-weighted, a stock’s index assignment has a significant impact on the extent of 
passive ownership.  For example, the 750th through 1,000th largest stocks will be included in the Russell 
1000 and be given small portfolio weights because they represent the smallest firms in their index, while 
the 1,001st through 1,250th largest stocks will be included in the Russell 2000 and be given weights that 
are an order of magnitude larger because they represent the largest firms in their index. Therefore, for 
each dollar invested in a passive fund using the Russell 1000 as a benchmark, very little of it will be 
invested in stocks at the bottom of that index; while for each dollar invested in a passive fund using the 
Russell 2000 as a benchmark, a large proportion of it will be invested in stocks at the top of the index.  
This benchmarking by passive funds leads to a sharp difference in ownership by passive 
institutional investors for stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to stocks at the bottom of the 
Russell 1000 even though these stocks are otherwise similar in terms of their overall market 
capitalization.  We find that the ownership by passively managed mutual funds is, on average, about 66% 
higher for stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 index relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 
index.  The difference in passive ownership matches what one would predict based on the amount of 
money estimated to be passively tracking the two indexes and corresponds with a significant shift in 
firms’ ownership structure. On average, the ownership stakes of three of the biggest passive investors, 
Vanguard, State Street, and Barclays Bank (which owned iShares during our sample), are a third higher 
among firms at the top of the Russell 2000, and each of these three institutions’ likelihood of owning 
more than 5% of a firm’s shares increases by two-thirds on average, while their likelihood of being a top 
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five shareholder is higher, on average, by 15%.  We find no corresponding difference in ownership of 
stocks around the cutoff by actively managed mutual funds.  
Exploiting this variation in ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff in an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation, we assess the effect of passive funds on firms’ governance structures and 
performance.  Specifically, we instrument for ownership by passive funds with an indicator for being 
assigned to the Russell 2000 in a given year. Our IV estimation relies on the assumption that, after 
conditioning on stocks’ market capitalization, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index does not directly affect 
our outcomes of interest except through its impact on passive ownership. This assumption seems 
reasonable in our setting in that it is unclear why index inclusion would be directly related to governance 
and corporate performance after restricting the sample to stocks near the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff and 
after controlling for the factor that determines index inclusion—stocks’ end-of-May market capitalization.  
The three broad governance outcomes we analyze reflect those highlighted in a recent speech by 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Vanguard (see McNabb, 2014) and the historical proxy-voting 
policies of the largest passive institutional investors. While passive institutions do vary their voting 
strategy across firms on governance issues (e.g., see Davis and Kim, 2007), three common themes of their 
historical proxy-voting policies were (1) to support greater board independence, (2) oppose antitakeover 
provisions, and (3) oppose unequal voting rights, as occurs when firms maintain a dual class share 
structure [e.g., see McNabb, (2014) and the Appendix for more details on voting guidelines of three 
prominent passive institutional investors]. We also analyze vote outcomes, such as the average support for 
management and governance-related shareholder proposals, which could be directly related to a potential 
mechanism by which passive investors can exert influence—their ability to exercise “voice.”   
Using our IV approach, we find that passive mutual funds have a significant impact on each of 
the three aspects of governance.  First, an increase in ownership by passive funds is associated with an 
increase in board independence.  A one standard deviation increase in ownership by passive funds is 
associated with about a 0.7 standard deviation increase in the share of directors on a firm’s board that are 
independent. Second, passive ownership is associated with the removal of takeover defenses. A one 
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standard deviation increase in ownership by passive funds is associated with a 3.5 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of removing a poison pill and a 2.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood 
of reducing restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.  These findings are economically 
large given that, on average, only 4% of firms remove a poison pill and 0.6% of firms eliminate 
restrictions on special meetings each year during our sample period. We find less evidence that passive 
ownership is associated with differences in other takeover defenses, including classified boards or 
supermajority voting requirements. Finally, an increase in passive ownership is associated with firms 
being less likely to have unequal voting rights, as captured by having a dual class share structure.  A one 
standard deviation increase in ownership by passive funds is associated with about a one standard 
deviation decrease in likelihood of having a dual class share structure. 
Our evidence suggests that a key mechanism by which passive investors exert their influence is 
through the power of their large voting blocs (i.e., voice).  Passive ownership is associated with a decline 
in the share of votes in support of management proposals, suggesting managers face a more contentious 
and attentive shareholder base, and an increase in support for governance-related shareholder proposals.  
A one standard deviation increase in ownership by passive funds is associated with about a 0.75 standard 
deviation decline in support for management proposals and about a 0.5 standard deviation increase in 
support for governance proposals. We find little evidence that these differences in support are driven by a 
change in either the number or type of proposals brought to a vote. 
Because the size and concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes can make it easier for 
activist investors to rally support for their demands (Brav et al., 2008; Bradley et al., 2010), an alternative 
mechanism by which passive investors might influence governance outcomes is by facilitating the activist 
efforts of other investors. However, we find no evidence of a positive association between ownership by 
passive funds and the likelihood of a firm experiencing a hedge fund activism event or takeover event.  
Instead, we find evidence that a larger ownership stake by passive funds is associated with a decline in 
hedge fund activism; a one standard deviation increase in ownership by passive mutual funds is 
associated with a 1.6 percentage point decline in the likelihood of a hedge fund activism event 
(statistically significant at the 10% level).  This decline in hedge fund activism is consistent with the 
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engagement of passive investors reducing the need for activism by other investors.  However, these 
findings do not exclude the possibility that passive investors’ ownership stakes increase the threat of 
activism by others, and that this perceived threat increases the power of passive investors’ voice.  For 
example, companies might be responsive to the governance views of passive investors so as to lessen the 
likelihood that these investors later lend support to an activist campaign initiated by others. 
Consistent with the observed changes in governance having a positive influence on firm value we 
find that, on average, an increase in passive ownership is associated with an improvement in firms’ future 
performance. While we find no evidence of an association between passive ownership and measures of 
performance in our main IV specification, we find evidence that longer-term ownership by passive mutual 
funds is associated with significant improvements in firms’ return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q.  On 
average, a one standard deviation increase in ownership by passive funds is associated with about a third 
of a standard deviation increase in ROA. We find little evidence, however, that passive fund ownership is 
associated with differences in the level or composition of managerial pay (a fourth issue that is 
prominently discussed by passive investors during our sample period) or firms’ capital structure or 
investments.  Overall, the findings are consistent with passive investors improving firm value by insisting 
on basic governance-related changes, as these changes appear to improve firm value but require a low 
level of costly monitoring, while potentially avoiding more costly and firm-specific interventions related 
to managerial pay and firms’ investment or capital structure choices. 
Our findings are robust to various specification choices.  For example, varying the number of 
stocks we investigate around the cutoff between the two indexes or varying the functional form we use to 
control for firms’ end-of-May market cap, which is the key factor determining stocks’ index assignment 
each year, does not affect our findings. The findings are also robust to adding various controls, including 
(1) firms’ float-adjusted market cap, which is a proprietary measure used by Russell to determine a 
stock’s ranking within indexes, (2) firms’ industry, (3) firms’ past stock returns, and (4) whether firms 
recently switched indexes.  Moreover, the findings are robust to using alternative definitions of passive 
ownership as the key explanatory variable, including the institution-level (13F) ownership stake of the 
6
 
 
three largest passive institutions or institution-level measure of “quasi-index” ownership, as defined by 
Bushee (2001).  Finally, we find no effect of passive ownership in placebo tests that assume differences in 
passive ownership at alternative market cap thresholds (i.e., instead of the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff).   
 Overall, our findings contribute to the broad literature that studies the effects of institutional 
ownership of common stock.  One strand of this literature analyzes institutional investors’ impact on 
various aspects of corporate governance, including governance indices (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chung and 
Zhang, 2011), CEO pay sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks, 2003), and shareholder proposals (Gillan and 
Starks, 2000). Another strand studies the effects of institutional investors on corporate policies, including 
leverage (Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent, 2015), dividends (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005), and 
Research and Development (R&D) (Bushee, 1998; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013).  A number 
of recent papers also highlight the role of specific types of institutional investors, such as activist hedge 
funds (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009).  We contribute to this literature by focusing on passive 
institutions—a less studied, but increasingly important set of institutional investors (e.g., see Cremers et 
al., 2015). In this regard, our paper is related to studies of several pension funds that follow passive 
investment strategies but successfully engage in activism (e.g., Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; 
Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). Some argue that activism by pension fund managers is at least partially 
motivated by politics rather than wealth maximization (Romano, 1993). Given that such pressures are 
largely confined to public pension funds, it is not clear that this success extends to passive investors more 
generally.  However, consistent with these case studies and contrary to survey evidence that passive 
investors might lack the willingness and ability to monitor managers (Useem et al., 1993), our evidence 
suggests that passive investors are not passive owners.  In particular, we find evidence that passive mutual 
funds successfully influence firms’ governance choices and improve long-term, firm-level performance.  
 The results of this paper also provide new insights into the determinants of firms’ governance 
structures and how large shareholders influence managerial decisions. Typically, institutional investors, 
such as blockholders, are thought to influence governance through a combination of “voice” and “exit” 
(e.g., Edmans, 2014; Levit, 2013). Voice refers to direct intervention by shareholders through either 
formal (e.g., proxy voting) or informal (e.g., letters to the board) channels (Harris and Raviv, 2010; Levit 
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and Malenko, 2011; Maug, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), while exit refers to the threat or actual 
selling of shares (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011).  However, 
because passive funds maintain portfolio weights that are often closely aligned with the weights in their 
chosen benchmark, their ability to influence managers is primarily limited to voice, which is thought to 
constrain their ability to influence corporate outcomes. Our paper finds otherwise.3    
 Finally, our work is related to recent papers that use the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff to analyze the 
price effects of additions and deletions from a market index (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich, 2015), the 
importance of institutional investors’ portfolio weights for monitoring incentives (Fich, Harford, and 
Tran, 2015), and the association between institution-level (13F) ownership and payouts, investment, CEO 
pay, management disclosure, acquisitions, and CEO power (Boone and White, 2015; Crane, Michenaud, 
and Weston, 2014; Lu, 2013; Mullins, 2014; Schmidt, 2012).  In contrast to these papers, we use the 
Russell 1000/2000 cutoff and fund-level data to isolate variation in ownership by passively managed 
mutual funds, and we analyze the impact of such investors on governance outcomes they explicitly 
mention as being important (e.g., independent directors, fewer takeover defenses, and equal voting 
rights), and the mechanisms by which passive investors might influence such governance outcomes (e.g., 
proxy voting, shareholder proposals, and facilitating activism by others).4  
 
																																								 																				
3 In this regard, our findings complement those of Iliev and Lowry (2015), who analyze the determinants of 
mutual funds’ reliance on proxy advisory service companies like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).  While not 
the focus of the paper, Section 4.3 of Iliev and Lowry presents evidence that index funds are more likely to “actively 
vote” their shares (as measured by being less likely to follow ISS vote recommendations on non-binding shareholder 
proposals). Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2013) find similar evidence that the voting decisions of Vanguard, and other 
large fund families, vary substantially from ISS vote recommendations.  Our findings demonstrate that the active 
monitoring of passive investors results in actual differences in firms’ governance structures and performance. 
4	 Beyond our focus on passively managed mutual funds and their impact on governance outcomes and 
corporate performance, our empirical methodology also differs from previous and contemporaneous papers that use 
the Russell cutoff as a source of identification.  And in contrast to findings in some of these previous studies, with 
our IV methodology we do not find differences in ownership by active institutions around the Russell 1000/2000 
threshold, nor do we find that index assignment affects other corporate outcomes, including capital structure, 
investments, the composition of managerial pay, CEO turnover, and acquisitions.  The tradeoffs of the different 
methodologies used in this identification setting are discussed in Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015), which can be 
found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2641548. 	
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2. Sample, data sources, and descriptive statistics 
In this paper, we merge stock-level mutual fund ownership data and Russell equity index 
membership with firm-level governance, proxy voting, accounting, and executive compensation data.  We 
now briefly describe each data source and our sample. 
   
2.1. Mutual fund holdings and Russell 1000/2000 index membership 
We use the S12 mutual fund holdings data compiled by Thomson Reuters and available from 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) to compute mutual fund holdings in a stock as a percent of its 
market capitalization. Since May 2004, all mutual funds holding stocks traded on U.S. exchanges are 
required to report those holdings every quarter to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using 
Forms N-CSR and N-Q.  Reported securities include all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq, Toronto, and Montreal 
common stocks.  Before May 2004, funds were required to report holdings only twice a year using Form 
N-30D, but many mutual funds voluntarily reported holdings in the other two quarters.  To adjust for any 
missing/unreported holdings between report dates prior to May 2004, we populate missing holdings by 
assuming that the holdings from the earlier date stay constant and use monthly data on prices and 
adjustment factors from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to compute imputed dollar values 
of these holdings.5 We exclude observations in which the total mutual fund holdings exceed a firm’s 
market capitalization. We calculate the total market cap of each stock using the CRSP monthly file as the 
sum of shares outstanding multiplied by price for each class of common stock associated with a firm (i.e., 
we sum across all PERMNOs associated with each PERMCO).  
To classify a mutual fund as either passively managed or actively managed, we use a method 
similar to that of Busse and Tong (2012) and Iliev and Lowry (2015).  Specifically, we obtain fund names 
by merging the Thomson Reuters data with the CRSP mutual fund data using the MFLINKS table 
available on WRDS.  We then flag a fund as passively managed if its fund name includes a string that 
																																								 																				
5	WRDS estimates that approximately 60% of funds additionally report holdings every quarter before 2004.  
Thanks to Denys Glushkov at WRDS for assistance with S12 holdings.	
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identifies it as an index fund or if the CRSP Mutual Fund Database classifies the fund as an index fund.6 
We classify all other mutual funds that can be matched to the CRSP mutual fund data as actively 
managed, and funds that cannot be matched are left unclassified. To generate variables for mutual fund 
ownership disaggregated into these three categories, we compute the percentage of each stock’s market 
capitalization that is owned by passive, active, and unclassified mutual funds at the end of each quarter.  
Our analysis is restricted to the sample of stocks found in the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes 
between 1998 and 2006.  We obtain data for the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes from Russell, and we start 
the sample at 1998 because this is the first year Russell provides us with its proprietary, float-adjusted 
market capitalization, which is used to determine the rank (i.e., portfolio weight) of each security within 
an index.  We end the sample prior to 2007, which is when Russell implemented a new methodology to 
construct the two indexes such that they no longer necessarily reflect the 1,000 and next 2,000 largest 
stocks by market capitalization.  Russell also provided us with their proprietary end-of-May total market 
capitalization values for each year from 2002 to 2006. The importance of the end-of-May market 
capitalizations and of ending the sample prior to 2007 is described in Section 3.   
 
2.2. Governance, voting, accounting, and compensation data 
Governance and voting data are mainly from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), formerly 
known as Riskmetrics, which provides information on several aspects of corporate governance for firms 
in the S&P 1500.  Following ISS’s classification of a director’s independence, which excludes linked 
directors (e.g., those with business ties to the firm), we calculate the percentage of independent directors 
on the boards of each firm for each year in the sample from the director data set.  The governance data set 
from ISS is used to create indicator variables for whether a firm removes a takeover defense or has a dual 
class share structure in a given year. The governance database is available for alternating years in the 
sample, except for 1998 when there is a three-year lag.  We also construct several variables related to 
																																								 																				
6 The strings we use to identify index funds are: Index, Idx, Indx, Ind_ (where _ indicates a space), Russell, 
S & P, S and P, S&P, SandP, SP, DOW, Dow, DJ, MSCI, Bloomberg, KBW, NASDAQ, NYSE, STOXX, FTSE, 
Wilshire, Morningstar, 100, 400, 500, 600, 900, 1000, 1500, 2000, and 5000.  
10
 
 
shareholder proposals and voting.  We use the voting results database from ISS to calculate the average 
percentage of shares that vote in support of management proposals at annual meetings and in support of 
shareholder-initiated governance proposals for each firm between reconstitutions of the Russell indexes 
(i.e., between July of year t and June of year t+1). 
Our data on poison pills are from Shark Repellent (FactSet).  Shark Repellent provides historical 
information on firms’ most recent poison pill, such as when the poison pill was renewed, withdrawn, or 
allowed to expire.  The database covers all firms in the Russell 3000 beginning in 2001. We define our 
variable for poison pill removal as an indicator equal to one if a firm’s poison pill is either withdrawn or 
allowed to expire at time t, and zero otherwise. Because Shark Repellent only reports information on a 
firm’s most recent poison pill, our indicator only flags firms that removed a poison pill during our sample 
period and did not reinstate a poison pill subsequently. 
Annual accounting data are from Compustat, and we use executive compensation data from 
Execucomp.  Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Definitions for all our key 
variables are provided in Appendix Table 1.    
 
2.3. Sample and descriptive statistics 
For our main analysis, we restrict our sample to stocks in the 250 bandwidth around the cutoff, as 
determined using the end-of-June Russell-assigned portfolio weights for stocks within each index.  This 
sample spans an economically important set of midcap and small cap stocks, and as discussed in Section 
7.1, our subsequent findings are robust to using both wider and narrower bandwidths.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main sample. The average level of mutual fund 
ownership (as a percentage of shares outstanding) is around 25%.  Actively managed funds are the largest 
category (approximately 19% of shares outstanding), with passive and unclassified funds each accounting 
for about 3% of shares outstanding.  Support for management proposals is high (85%), consistent with the 
notion that many of the issues addressed by these proposals are routine in nature, while support for 
shareholder-initiated governance proposals is considerably lower (36%).  Independent directors make up 
65% of the total number of directors for firms in the sample.  The table also shows that poison pill 
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removals and the lessening of restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting are relatively 
uncommon events in our sample, occurring in just 4% and 0.6% of firm-year observations, respectively. 
About 13% of firms have a dual class share structure.  Finally, firms’ ROA averages about 0.03.  
 
3. Empirical framework 
Identifying the impact of passive investors on corporate governance and performance poses an 
empirical challenge.  Cross-sectional correlations between passive ownership, governance, and 
performance might not reflect a causal relation because ownership by passive investors could be 
correlated with factors—such as firms’ access to capital, investment opportunities, or ownership by active 
investors—that directly affect corporate outcomes. Failure to control for such factors could introduce an 
omitted variable bias that confounds inferences. To overcome this challenge and to determine the 
importance of passive investors, we use stocks’ assignment to the top of the Russell 2000 index as an 
exogenous shock to ownership by passive mutual funds.  We now describe our identification strategy. 
  
3.1. Russell index construction and passive institutional investors 
Passive funds attempt to match the performance of a market index by holding a basket of 
representative securities in the particular market index being tracked in proportion to their weights in the 
index. The most visible types of passive funds are index funds, which hold nearly all stocks in the market 
index rather than a representative sample.  
Two market indexes widely used as benchmarks are the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000.  The 
Russell 1000 comprises the largest 1,000 U.S. stocks in terms of market capitalization, while the Russell 
2000 comprises the next largest 2,000 stocks.  An example of an index fund that uses the Russell 1000 as 
a benchmark is the Vanguard Russell 1000 Index Fund (VRNIX), while the Vanguard Russell 2000 Index 
Fund (VRTIX) uses the Russell 2000 as a benchmark.   
To account for changes in stocks’ ranking by market cap, the Russell indexes are reconstituted 
each year at the end of June.  On the last Friday of June, Russell Investments determines which stocks 
will be included in the two indexes for the following 12 months using market capitalization as of the last 
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trading day in May of that year.7  In other words, the Russell 1000 includes the 1,000 largest stocks at the 
end of the last trading day in May, while the Russell 2000 includes the next 2,000 largest stocks.8   Each 
stock’s weight in the index is then determined using its end-of-June float-adjusted market cap.  The float-
adjusted market capitalization is different than the market capitalization used to determine index 
membership in that it only includes the value of shares that are available to the public. For example, 
shares held by another company or individual that exceed 10% of shares outstanding, by another member 
of a Russell index, by an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), or by a government will be removed 
when calculating a firm’s float-adjusted market capitalization, as will unlisted share classes.  Therefore, a 
stock that was the 1,000th largest stock in total market capitalization need not be the stock with the 
smallest portfolio weight in the Russell 1000 index.   
Because the Russell indexes are value-weighted, index assignment has a significant effect on 
portfolio weights; the 1,000th largest stock at the end of May will be included in the Russell 1000 and be 
given a very small portfolio weight within its index, while the 1,001st largest stock will be included in the 
Russell 2000 and be given a much larger weight in its index. For example, between 1998 and 2006, the 
average portfolio weight of the bottom 250 stocks in the Russell 1000 was 0.012%, while the average 
portfolio weight of the top 250 stocks in the Russell 2000 was an order of magnitude larger at 0.127%.  
The difference in portfolio weights persists over a wide range around the cutoff.  This is seen in Fig. 2, in 
which we plot the end-of-June portfolio weights of the 500 smallest float-adjusted stocks in the Russell 
1000 and the 500 largest float-adjusted stocks in the Russell 2000 for the year 2006. 
																																								 																				
7 However, when the last Friday of June falls on the 29th or 30th, the two indexes are reconstituted on the 
preceding Friday.  During the following 12 months, stocks are only deleted from the indexes due to Chapter 7 
bankruptcy filings, delistings, and corporate actions (takeovers), while Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are added 
quarterly to the indexes on the basis of the market capitalization breaks established during the most recent 
reconstitution. For more details regarding the reconstitution process and eligibility for inclusion in the Russell 
indexes, see Russell Investments (2013). 
8 Beginning in 2007, Russell implemented a “banding” policy in which firms within a certain range of the 
cutoff would not switch indexes.  For example, a firm that was in the Russell 2000 index last year but was among 
the 1,000 largest firms this year would only move to the Russell 1000 index if its market capitalization exceeded a 
certain threshold (Investment Technology Group, 2008). Because our identification strategy relies on controlling for 
the factors that determine a firm’s index assignment each year, we restrict our attention to years prior to the 
implementation of this banding policy in which only the end-of-May market capitalization calculated by Russell is 
used to determine firms’ index assignment.  For more details on how the banding thresholds are determined each 
year, see Russell Investments (2013).  
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 These differences in portfolio weights can have a significant impact on the extent of a stock’s 
ownership by passive investors.  Because passive funds weight their holdings based on the portfolio 
weights of the underlying index in an attempt to minimize tracking error, it is more important that they 
match the weights of the stocks at the top of the index than of stocks at the bottom of the index. In other 
words, for each dollar invested in a passive fund benchmarked to the Russell 1000, very little of it will be 
invested in stocks at the bottom of that index, while for each dollar invested in a passive fund 
benchmarked to the Russell 2000, a large proportion of it will be invested in stocks at the top of the index.  
Because of the considerable amount of money passively tracking the two Russell indexes (Chang, Hong, 
and Liskovich, 2015), the portfolio decisions of passive institutions can lead to large ownership 
differences in stocks around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. 
The importance of index assignment for ownership by passive mutual funds is illustrated in Fig. 
3, in which we sort stocks using their end-of-May CRSP market capitalization and plot the average share 
of firms in the Russell 2000 and average end-of-September ownership by passively managed funds.  The 
sample in Fig. 3 contains the top 500 stocks of the Russell 2000 and bottom 500 stocks of the Russell 
1000 for each year between 1998 and 2006, as determined using the end-of-June Russell-assigned 
portfolio weights within each index. By construction, the top panel of Fig. 3 shows no break in size 
between the 500th and 501st largest stocks in this sample, but as shown in the middle panel, there is a 
rather large jump in the probability of being assigned to the Russell 2000 index around this break. The 
end-of-May market cap reported by CRSP does not perfectly predict a stock’s index assignment because 
Russell makes a number of adjustments when calculating its proprietary market capitalization values such 
that these values, which are used to determine a stock’s index membership, do not perfectly match market 
capitalizations reported in sources such as CRSP.  And consistent with index assignment having an 
important impact on ownership, the bottom panel of Fig. 3 demonstrates a distinct jump in the ownership 
of passive funds around this midway point.  During our sample period, the total ownership stake of 
passive funds is, on average, 66% higher for a stock among the top 250 stocks of the Russell 2000 relative 
to a stock among the bottom 250 stocks of the Russell 1000 (p-value of difference < 0.001).   
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The magnitude of the observed difference in passive ownership corresponds well to the 
magnitude one would predict using estimates of the total amount of passive assets tracking each of the 
two indexes.  While the Russell 1000 is more than ten times larger in total market cap than the Russell 
2000 during our sample period, there is only about two to three times more dollars passively tracking the 
Russell 1000 relative to the Russell 2000 (see Chang, Hong, and Liskovich, 2015, Table 1, Panel A).9 
Using their estimates for 2004, $38.9 billion in assets were passively tracking the Russell 2000, which 
accounts for about 3.14% of the index’s total market cap of $1,237 billion, while there was only $84.9 
billion of assets passively tracking the Russell 1000, accounting for just 0.71% of the index’s total market 
cap of $12,002 billion. Based on these estimates, assignment to the Russell 2000 in that year would 
increase a stock’s passive institutional ownership by about 2.5 percentage points, which is similar to the 
2.1 percentage point increase we detect in 2004 using our measure of passive ownership. In practice, the 
realized differences in passive ownership we detect will be slightly smaller around the cutoff than 
predicted by this simple back-of-the-envelope calculation because passive investments by some 
institutions, like pension funds, are not reported in the S12 mutual fund database.  
 The importance of index assignment for passive ownership is further highlighted by examining 
the total ownership stake of three of the largest passive institutions during our sample period—Vanguard, 
State Street, and Barclays Bank (which owned iShares during our sample).  For this, we use the Thomson 
Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database, which reports the total holdings, both passive and active, 
of each institution.  On average, the ownership stake of each of these three institutions is a third higher for 
the 250 firms at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to the bottom 250 firms of the Russell 1000, while the 
likelihood of each institution owning more than 5% of a firm’s shares is two-thirds higher and the 
likelihood of being a top five shareholder is 15% higher.  
We find no evidence that index assignment is related to ownership by actively managed funds.  
This is shown in the two panels of Fig. 4 in which we plot the percent ownership for actively managed 
																																								 																				
9	The disproportionate amount of money passively tracking the Russell 2000 occurs because the Russell 
2000 is the most widely used market index for small cap stocks.  The Russell 1000, which spans both large and 
midcap stocks, is less widely used as a benchmark because it faces more competition from other large cap and 
midcap market indexes, including the S&P 500 (which is the most popular market index), the CRSP U.S. midcap 
index, and the S&P 400 midcap index.	
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funds and mutual funds we are unable to classify.  For each panel, we scale the vertical axis to span a 
standard deviation on each side of the sample mean.  As seen in those panels, there is no corresponding 
difference in either active or unclassified mutual fund ownership; we formally test and demonstrate this 
lack of a difference in other types of ownership in Section 3.3.   
3.2. Identification strategy and empirical specification  
 The construction of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes thus provides a source of exogenous 
variation in ownership by passive mutual funds.  Stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 exhibit greater 
ownership by passive investors because of their inclusion at the top of their index, while stocks at the 
bottom of the Russell 1000 do not.  Because index assignment is determined by an arbitrary rule 
surrounding the market capitalization of the 1,000th largest firm, this variation in ownership is plausibly 
exogenous after conditioning on firms’ market capitalization.   
 We use an instrumental variable strategy to identify the effect of ownership by passive mutual 
funds on firms’ corporate governance and corporate performance; specifically, we use inclusion in the 
Russell 2000 as an instrument for ownership by passive funds. Because index assignment is determined 
by a stock’s market capitalization, and because market capitalization can directly affect a stock’s 
institutional ownership for reasons separate from index assignment, we also include a robust set of 
controls for stocks’ end-of-May market capitalization in our estimation.  Specifically, we estimate the 
following:  
	
 
Yit =α + βPassive%it + θn Ln(Mktcapit )( )n
n=1
N
∑ + γ Ln(Float )it +δ t + ε it , 		 (1)	
where Yit is the outcome of interest for firm i in reconstitution year t (i.e., from end-of-June year t to end-
of-June of year t+1) scaled by its sample standard deviation; Passive%it is the percent of a firm’s shares 
held by passively managed mutual funds at the end of the first quarter of the reconstitution year t (i.e., end 
of September) scaled by its sample standard deviation; Mktcapit is the end-of-May CRSP market 
capitalization of stock i in year t; and Floatit is the float-adjusted market capitalization calculated by 
Russell when initially setting the portfolio weights during the end-of-June reconstitution. We scale both 
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Yit and Passive%it by their sample standard deviations so that the point estimate of  can be interpreted 
as the standard deviation difference in Yit for a one standard deviation increase in Passive%it. We control 
for float-adjusted market capitalization because it is used by Russell to compute portfolio weights within 
each index and could be related to a firm’s stock liquidity, which might affect firms’ governance and 
other corporate outcomes (Back, Li, and Ljungqvist, 2014; Edmans, Fang, and Zur, 2013). We also 
include reconstitution year fixed effects, , to ensure that our estimates are identified using within-year 
variation in ownership and are not driven by the aggregate upward trend in ownership by passive 
investors (see Fig. 1).  Finally, we cluster the standard errors, , at the firm level.10   
 To account for the possibility that ownership by passive funds, as measured using Passive%, 
might be correlated with the error term, , because of the omitted variable issues discussed above, we 
instrument for ownership by passive funds using index assignment.  Specifically, we instrument Passive% 
in the above estimation using R2000it, which is an indicator equal to one if stock i is part of the Russell 
2000 index in reconstitution year t.  As shown in Fig. 3, being assigned to the Russell 2000 is associated 
with a significant jump in ownership by passive funds for stocks at the top of Russell 2000 relative to 
stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.  
Our IV estimation relies on the assumption that, after conditioning on stocks’ market 
capitalization, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index is associated with an increase in Passive% (relevance 
condition) but does not directly affect our outcomes of interest except through its impact on ownership by 
passive investors (exclusion restriction).  We verify the relevance condition below in our first-stage 
estimations, and the exclusion restriction seems reasonable in that it is unclear why index inclusion would 
be directly related to our outcomes of interest after robustly controlling for the factor that determines 
index inclusion—firms’ end-of-May market capitalization, as calculated by Russell.  To control for firms’ 
market capitalization, we restrict our sample to the 250 stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 and top 
250 stocks of the Russell 2000 and include a robust set of controls for firms’ log market capitalization, 
																																								 																				
10 We do not include firm fixed effects in our estimation since only a small fraction of our sample firms 
switch indexes at some point during the sample and because many of the governance and corporate outcomes we 
study are likely to be affected by sustained rather than transitory variation in passive ownership.  Since firm fixed 
effects will remove this sustained variation, they will likely not capture the relevant variation and thus potentially 
provide misleading inferences (e.g., see McKinnish, 2008; Gormley and Matsa, 2014).     
β
δ t
ε
ε
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Ln(Mktcap), as measured using CRSP data, by varying the polynomial order N we use to control for end-
of-May market capitalization.11  In later robustness tests, we also show robustness to varying the number 
of firms we include around the cutoff between the two indexes and to instead using end-of-May market 
caps to rank stocks and select our sample each year.  
The use of R2000it as an instrument allows us to isolate an exogenous source of variation in 
passive ownership.  While non-index funds that passively seek to deliver the performance of a benchmark 
portfolio have discretion over which stocks within the benchmark to hold, the instrumental variable never 
uses such endogenous variation in passive ownership; the IV estimation only uses variation in ownership 
that is driven by a stock’s index assignment and the reshuffling of holdings by passively managed mutual 
funds seeking to minimize their tracking error.  
We do not use the actual portfolio weight or ranks of stocks as our instrument because this would 
introduce a potentially serious endogeneity concern.  In particular, this is problematic because after 
Russell assigns stocks to an index, it determines actual weights using various endogenous factors, 
including liquidity and inside ownership.  For the most illiquid, highest-inside-ownership stocks, Russell 
assigns a smaller portfolio weight than would be justified based purely on their end-of-May market 
capitalization so as to minimize the costs of institutions attempting to track the index.  Because Russell 
index weights are related to a stock’s liquidity and inside ownership, it would be problematic to use them 
as instruments because both factors could directly affect the governance structures of firms.12   
 
3.3. First-stage estimation 
In this section, we report estimates of our first-stage regression of passive mutual fund holdings 
on membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  Specifically, we estimate   
	
 
Passive%it =η + λR2000it + χn Ln(Mktcapit )( )n
n=1
N
∑ +σLn(Float )it +δ t + uit , 	 (2)	
																																								 																				
11 At some level, our estimation can be viewed as one that makes use of a threshold event in a non-
Regression Discontinuity (RD) estimation, as discussed in Bakke and Whited (2012).  
12	Chang, Hong, and Liskovich (2015) and Mullins (2014) also discuss this issue of why the actual weights 
or rankings should not be used as instruments or as part of a regression discontinuity estimation.	
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where R2000it is a dummy variable equal to one if stock i is in the Russell 2000 index for reconstitution 
year t (i.e., from end-of-June of year t to end of June year t+1).  In our initial tests, we also analyze other 
outcome measures, including the percentage of shares outstanding owned by all mutual funds; the 
percentage of shares outstanding owned by actively managed funds; and the percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by unclassified mutual funds.  The model is estimated over the 1998‒2006 period, and 
uses a bandwidth of 250 firms and a third-order polynomial.   
 The results, reported in Table 2, confirm that mutual fund ownership is related to membership in 
the Russell, particularly for passive mutual funds. So that the point estimates in Table 2 align with the 
observed differences in ownership shown in Fig. 3, we do not scale the ownership variables by their 
sample standard deviations in these initial estimates.  The first column shows that aggregate mutual fund 
ownership is significantly higher (at the 10% level) for the 250 stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 than 
for the 250 stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.  As expected, this relation appears to be driven 
entirely by passive funds: the estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level for the 
passive funds (column 2), but insignificant for actively managed and unclassified funds (columns 3 and 
4).  
In Table 3 we demonstrate that the estimated relation between passive ownership and Russell 
2000 membership is robust to using lower order polynomials, and to better quantify the economic 
magnitude of the observed difference in ownership, we scale Passive% by its sample standard deviation.  
Using a bandwidth of 250 firms and varying the polynomial order of controls for market cap, we 
consistently find an increase in ownership by passive funds of about a half of a sample standard deviation 
(Table 3, columns 1–3).  In all cases, the increase is statistically significant at the 1% level.13  
The lack of a difference in ownership for actively managed and unclassified mutual funds is also 
robust to varying the polynomial order of controls for Mktcap.  This can be seen in Appendix Table 2.  
																																								 																				
13 Because our IV model is just-identified, the IV estimation is median-unbiased and weak instruments are 
unlikely to be a concern in our setting, especially given the strong first-stage estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
Additionally, the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat on the excluded instrument exceeds 10, providing further confidence that a 
weak instrument is unlikely to be a concern (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002; Angrist and Pischke, 2009).   
19
 
 
Consistent with actively managed funds being unaffected by a stock’s index assignment, we find no 
evidence of a difference in ownership by either actively managed funds or unclassified funds and the 
point estimates are economically small (between 1% to 5% of a their sample standard deviations).  
We also do not find evidence that membership in the Russell 2000 is associated with an increase 
in the visibility of a stock and subsequent analyst coverage, which is another mechanism by which index 
assignment might improve firms’ governance.  In particular, if we re-estimate Eq. (2) instead using the 
number of analysts as the dependent variable, we find no evidence that assignment to the top of the 
Russell 2000 is associated with greater analyst coverage; if anything, we find evidence that inclusion in 
the Russell 2000 is associated with less analyst coverage but the estimates are not robust to wider 
bandwidths.  Likewise, Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) find no evidence of an increase in media 
coverage among firms at the top of the Russell 2000.  The lack of an increase in either analyst or media 
coverage among firms at the top of the Russell 2000 bolsters our assumption that index assignment in our 
setting will only affects firms’ governance structure through its effect on passive ownership.   
 
3.4. Why index assignment might matter   
A question that naturally arises is why index assignment might matter at all for firms’ passive 
ownership. If the increased ownership stake that comes with a stock being assigned to the Russell 2000 
index allows passive investors to exert additional influence and correct a governance structure they deem 
suboptimal (as our findings below suggest), why would passive investors not also increase their 
ownership stake among stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 so as to exert more influence among 
those companies as well?  In other words, what would prevent passive institutions from being more 
active, and hence, undoing the potential importance of index assignment? 
There are two likely explanations for why index assignment might matter for firms’ governance 
structures. First, passive institutions are simply more focused on minimizing expenses and tracking errors 
than on affecting governance. While increasing an ownership stake for one stock at the bottom of the 
Russell 1000 might not significantly affect a fund’s tracking errors relative to a Russell 1000 benchmark, 
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a similar increase for a number of other stocks would. Moreover, such targeted activism would likely 
increase fund expenses since the passive investor would need to research which stocks to target.  
Combined, these two effects would likely result in lost market share to competitors with lower costs and 
lower tracking errors. Second, index assignment can create a coordinated increase in ownership by 
passive institutions that might otherwise be hard to replicate. Achieving the same total increase in 
ownership stake can be prohibitively large for any one passive institution to achieve alone, and 
coordinating a combined ownership increase among multiple passive institutions might either be too 
costly or impose additional regulatory disclosure requirements these institutions wish to avoid.  
Overall, our finding that index assignment corresponds with a shift in passive ownership suggests 
that institutions managing passive funds are not active in the traditional sense of trying to accumulate or 
exit positions since such actions would undo the importance of index assignment. We now turn to 
analyzing whether passive ownership and index assignment affect firms’ governance structures and the 
potential mechanisms by which passive investors can exert influence. 
 
4. How passive investors affect firms’ corporate governance 
To select the governance outcomes for our analysis, we start from a 2014 speech given by the 
Chairman and CEO of Vanguard, Bill McNabb, that summarizes the broad governance issues on which 
Vanguard focuses. These issues include “Independent oversight” (i.e., board independence), “Annual 
director elections and minimal anti-takeover devices,” “Shareholder voting rights consistent with 
economic interest” (i.e., no dual class share structures that provide disparate voting rights to different 
groups of shareholders), and “Sensible compensation tied to performance.”14 We then compare these 
issues to the proxy-voting policies of Vanguard and other large passive investors during our earlier 
sample period by obtaining the initial proxy-voting policies provided to the SEC by Vanguard, State 
																																								 																				
     14 This speech, which can be found at 
http://www.lerner.udel.edu/sites/default/files/WCCG/PDFs/events/Tran-
script%20_UDel%20Corp%20Governance%2010%2030%202014_%20FINAL%20for%20UD%20website.pdf, is 
based on the governance principles Vanguard states on its website at https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-
voting/corporate-governance/index.html (Vanguard, 2014).  Two other governance issues that were discussed in this 
speech, but are not as easily tested, are “Accountability” (of both the board and management) and “Shareholder 
engagement.”  
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Street, and Barclays Bank when the filing of such policies was first required beginning on July 1, 2003. 
From these proxy-voting policies, it is clear that these four broad governance issues were also a focus of 
passive investors during our sample period. In particular, the largest passive investors (1) supported 
greater board independence, (2) opposed takeover defenses, (3) opposed unequal voting rights, as occurs 
when firms maintain a dual class share structure, and (4) supported compensation plans that align 
management’s interests with shareholders and avoid excessive awards (see Appendix).15   
But, do passive investors, whose impact tends to be limited to “voice,” have an effect on these 
aspects of corporate governance? In this section, we investigate these questions using the identification 
strategy and instrumental variable estimation described in Section 3 to analyze their impact on three of 
these issues: board independence, takeover defenses, and equal voting rights.  We will analyze their 
impact on the fourth issue, the level and structure of executive compensation, in Section 6.2.   
 
4.1. Independent directors 
We first assess whether passive mutual funds exert influence on board independence.  Increasing 
the percent of independent directors was a specific concern of many passive investors during our sample 
period (see Appendix) and is one dimension of governance in which passive investors have a direct say 
via their proxy votes in director elections. Passive investor support for independent directors likely stems 
from the belief that independent directors are more likely to be effective monitors (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Weisbach, 1988). Table 4 reports results for our IV estimation using percentage of independent 
directors, scaled by its sample standard deviation, as the dependent variable. 
We find that passive mutual funds do indeed have a significant impact on this key dimension of 
corporate governance.  We find a statistically significant positive relation (at the 1% level) between 
Passive% and the percentage of independent directors that is robust to various polynomial order controls 
																																								 																				
15 These historical proxy-voting guidelines can be found on the SEC website and are summarized in the 
Appendix. Other popular governance issues, like splitting the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board, 
however, are not mentioned in either the Vanguard speech or the proxy-voting guidelines of the largest passive 
investors.  At some level, this particular exclusion is not surprising since some passive institutions (e.g., Vanguard) 
have the same individual act as both CEO and Chairman, and consistent with passive investors not holding a view 
on this issue, we find no association between passive ownership and whether a company’s CEO serves as Chairman 
of the Board. 
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for market capitalization.  The economic magnitude of the relation is sizable.  A one standard deviation 
increase in ownership by passive funds is associated with a 0.65 to 0.76 standard deviation increase in the 
share of independent directors on a firm’s board (Table 4, columns 1–3). In unreported analysis, we find 
this increase in director independence is not driven by an increase in board size; to the contrary, greater 
ownership by passive funds is associated with smaller boards.16  
The impact of passive mutual funds on board independence is even larger prior to changes 
regarding board independence requirements at the NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges.  In late 2002, both 
exchanges proposed changes to require that all firms listed on the exchange have a majority of 
independent directors, and the SEC approved the proposed changes in 2003. Consistent with passive 
investors having a larger influence on board independence prior to 2003, we find that a one standard 
deviation increase in ownership by passive funds is associated with a 1.3 to 1.4 standard deviation 
increase in share of independent directors on a firm’s board prior to 2003 (Table 5, columns 1–3) but only 
a 0.26 to 0.35 standard deviation increase after 2002 (columns 4–6).  The differences in the estimates 
across time periods are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.17   
   
4.2. Takeover defenses 
 We now consider the association between ownership by passive mutual funds and takeover 
defenses.  Opposition to takeover defenses, including poison pills and restrictions on shareholders’ ability 
to call special meetings, were a common theme of passive investors’ proxy-voting guidelines during our 
sample (see Appendix).  
While poison pills can be in shareholders’ interests under some circumstances, they are often seen 
as a mechanism used to shelter managers from the disciplining effects of hostile takeovers. Specifically, 
																																								 																				
16 Because ISS only covers firms in the S&P 1500, the sample size in Table 4 is about a third smaller than 
the first-stage estimates reported in Table 3.  However, this reduced sample size does not pose a problem for our 
estimation.  The first-stage estimates in the smaller sample of observations with non-missing director data remain 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  This can be seen in Appendix Table 3, Panel A.  The first-stage estimates for 
our later estimates in Tables 6, 7, and 8 can also be found in Appendix Table 3.  We do not separately report first-
stage estimates for Tables 9 and 10 since their samples are comparable to that used in Table 3. 
17 While the proposed exchange listing requirements did not become effective until 2004, many firms began 
complying in 2003.  Given this, we use the year 2003 as the potential breaking point. 
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poison pills (formally known as “shareholder rights plans”) effectively bar any single shareholder from 
acquiring more than a pre-defined percentage of shares (often between 10% and 15%) without 
significantly diluting their holdings (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009).  While Coates (2000) notes that 
essentially every firm has a “shadow pill” in place because a pill can be implemented by a board at any 
time without shareholder approval, having a poison pill in place is still thought to provide managers with 
advantages in fighting off hostile bids and unwanted activists.18  Moreover, institutional investors widely 
call for the redemption of poison pills and support efforts to subject them to shareholder votes to improve 
the accountability of managers and boards.   
We find evidence that ownership by passive funds is associated with an increase in the removal of 
poison pills.  To determine the influence of passive institutions on the removal of poison pills, we 
estimate Eq. (1) with an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s poison pill is either withdrawn or 
allowed to expire and zero otherwise.  These estimates are reported in Table 6.  The estimated coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level).  A one standard deviation increase in Passive% is 
associated with a 0.18–0.20 standard deviation (i.e., 3.3–3.8 percentage point) increase in the likelihood 
of a poison pill being removed (Table 6, columns 1–3). The estimate is economically sizable given that, 
on average, only 4% of firms remove a poison pill each year. 
 We next analyze whether ownership by passive mutual funds is associated with a greater ability 
for shareholders to call a special meeting, another important aspect of governance (Daines and Klausner, 
2001; Cremers and Nair, 2005).  Similar to poison pills, restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special 
meetings can represent a potential impediment to effective governance by delaying dissident 
shareholders’ ability to remove directors, and such restrictions, especially if combined with a poison pill, 
are also seen as an effective takeover defense for entrenched managers (Daines and Klausner, 2001). To 
assess the ability of passive institutions to reduce restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special 
meetings, we estimate Eq. (1) with an indicator variable equal to one if the firm eliminates such 
restrictions, and zero otherwise.  These estimates are reported in columns 4–6 of Table 6.   
																																								 																				
18 As noted by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), “having a pill in place saves the need to install it in ‘the 
heat of battle’… [and] signals to hostile bidders that the board ‘will not go easy’.” 
24
 
 
We find evidence that ownership by passive funds is associated with the removal of restrictions 
on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings. The estimated coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) in all of the estimations; in particular, a one standard deviation increase in 
passive ownership is associated with about a 0.30–0.34 standard deviation (i.e., 2.4–2.7 percentage point) 
increase in the likelihood that a firm eliminates restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special 
meetings.  Relative to the average share of firms that lift restrictions each year in our sample, which is 
about 0.6%, the estimated magnitude is sizable. 
In unreported analysis, we also analyzed the impact of passive ownership on whether firms have 
annual director elections.  Staggered director elections and classified boards are another type of takeover 
defense that passive institutions typically oppose [see McNabb (2014) and the Appendix for examples).  
We find suggestive evidence that passive ownership is also associated with firms being less likely to have 
a classified board, but the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The statistically 
weaker results for classified boards could partially be an artifact of the time period of our sample; Guo, 
Kruse, and Nohel (2008) note that shareholder efforts to de-classify boards intensified significantly in 
2003 following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Consistent with this possibility, we find stronger 
evidence that passive ownership is associated with firms being less likely to have a classified board after 
2003, but the estimates are only statistically significant in bandwidths wider than the 250 stocks around 
the threshold we use in our main analysis.19   
 
4.3. Equal voting rights and dual class share structures 
 Finally, we analyze whether ownership by passive mutual funds is associated with the voting 
rights of shareholders.  Passive institutions uniformly oppose dual class share structures and any other 
form of unequal voting rights and often threaten to withhold support for managers or directors of any 
company that does not provide equal voting rights to all shareholders (see McNabb (2014) and the 
																																								 																				
19 In unreported analysis, we also analyzed the impact of passive ownership on supermajority vote 
requirements, a fourth antitakeover device specifically mentioned in Vanguard and State Street’s historical proxy-
voting policies.  We find a negative association between passive ownership and the likelihood a firm has 
supermajority voting requirements, but the point estimates are neither statistically significant nor economically 
large. 
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Appendix for examples).  Passive institutions also state they will refuse to support any attempts by 
companies to implement a dual class share structure (as might occur during a merger).  Moreover, by 
concentrating voting power among insiders, Klausner (2012) argues that dual class share structures are 
one of the most powerful takeover defenses, providing yet another reason passive investors oppose them, 
and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) find evidence that dual class share structures can negatively 
impact firm value.  
To assess whether ownership by passive mutual funds is associated with a firm being less likely 
to have unequal voting rights, we construct an indicator that equals one if the firm has a dual class share 
structure, and zero otherwise, as determined by ISS.  These estimates are reported in Table 7.  We find 
evidence that ownership by passive funds is associated with firms being less likely to have a dual class 
share structure. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in all of 
the estimations; a one standard deviation increase in Passive% is associated with about a one standard 
deviation decrease in the likelihood that a firm has a dual class share structure.20  
Another voting rights issue that is discussed in the proxy-voting guidelines of passive investors is 
their opposition to cumulative voting.  As Vanguard states in its proxy-voting guidelines, cumulative 
voting can allow “shareholders a voice in director elections that is disproportionate to their economic 
investment in the corporation.”  However, in unreported analysis, we do not find an association between 
passive ownership and whether firms have cumulative voting for directors. 
 
5. Possible mechanisms by which passive investors influence governance 
A key mechanism by which passive investors might influence a firm’s governance structure is via 
their voice. In particular, passive investors can use their ownership stake and ability to vote to monitor 
firms and ensure conformity with their views on governance structures.  Alternatively, it is also possible 
																																								 																				
20 Because adding a dual class share structure is typically not allowed by stock exchanges after a firm’s 
initial IPO, the observed difference in dual class structures is most likely driven by firms removing a dual class share 
structure rather than failing to add one.  Consistent with this, in unreported estimates we find that passive ownership 
is positively associated with the removal of dual class shares, but unlike our findings for poison pills and restrictions 
on shareholder meetings, the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  This is potentially 
attributed to the relatively small number of companies that make such changes following their initial public offering; 
on average, only about 0.9% of firms remove a dual class share structure each year in our sample.  	
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the passive investors’ influence is not the result of them being active owners.  Instead, passive investors’ 
concentrated ownership might facilitate activism by others, such as hedge funds, by lowering the costs for 
other activists attempting to coordinate votes against management (Brav et al., 2008; Bradley et al., 
2010).  In this section, we investigate these two possible channels.  
 
5.1. The power of passive investors’ “voice”  
To address whether passive investors exercise voice and influence firms’ governance through 
their large voting blocs, we first analyze support for management proposals. Shareholder voting at annual 
meetings is a fundamental duty of shareholders, and votes against management proposals can be a proxy 
for increased monitoring by shareholders (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1983). To assess whether passive 
institutions influence voting outcomes, we estimate Eq. (1) with the dependent variable defined as the 
average percentage of shares that vote in support of management proposals.  
Consistent with an increased monitoring of managers and with passive investors exercising voice, 
we find that greater ownership by passive funds is associated with less support for management proposals 
(Table 8, columns 1–3).  The estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant (at the 1% 
level). A one standard deviation increase in ownership by passive funds is associated, on average, with 
about a 0.75 standard deviation decline in support for management proposals. Consistent with passive 
investors being active in monitoring managers, management appears to be confronted with a more 
contentious shareholder base when passive funds, which are less able to vote with their feet, make up a 
larger percentage of the ownership. 
The decline in support for management proposals does not originate from a shift in the number or 
type of management proposals put to a vote.  In unreported analysis, we find that greater ownership by 
passive funds is not associated with a change in the total number of management proposals, and we find 
little evidence of an association with the composition of proposals. The lack of difference in the 
composition of proposals suggests the lower support for management proposals is not driven by managers 
submitting a greater number of less-shareholder-friendly proposals. 
We next analyze support for governance-related shareholder proposals. While these proposals are 
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non-binding, they potentially increase pressure on boards to make changes to their firms’ governance 
structure (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). If passive investors use such votes to exercise voice and 
influence, we might expect to observe an increase in support for such proposals.   
In further support of passive investors exercising voice via their votes, we find evidence that 
ownership by passive funds is associated with an overall increase in support for governance-related 
shareholder proposals. On average, a one standard deviation increase in ownership by passive funds is 
associated with a 0.49–0.65 standard deviation increase in support for governance proposals (Table 8, 
columns 4–6). While the increase in support is only statistically significant at the 10% level when adding 
second- or third-order polynomial controls (p-values 0.062 and 0.064, respectively), the implied 
magnitudes are economically large. The lower statistical significance likely reflects the relatively small 
number of such governance proposals.  Similar to management proposals, we find no systematic relation 
between ownership by passive funds and differences in the types of shareholder proposals voted on.   
 
5.2. No increased activism by others  
An alternative mechanism by which passive ownership might influence firms’ governance 
structure is by facilitating activism by other, non-passive investors.  In particular, the size and 
concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes can increase activist investors’ ability to rally 
support for their demands (Brav et al., 2008; Bradley et al., 2010).  Such added pressure from activist 
investors might also explain a number of the governance differences we observe.  In other words, is it 
possible that the observed differences in governance are not driven by passive investors being engaged 
owners, but rather, driven by their ownership stake making it easier for others to engage in activism? 
We find no evidence, however, that greater ownership by passive mutual funds is associated with 
more activism by non-passive institutions; instead, we find evidence of less activism by non-passive 
institutions, consistent with passive investors monitoring managers and reducing the need for activism by 
other investors.  To demonstrate this, we estimate Eq. (1) with an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm experiences a hedge fund activism event, as defined in Brav et al. (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim 
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(2010), and zero otherwise.21  These estimates are reported in Table 9. The point estimates are negative 
and statistically significant. We find that a one standard deviation increase in passive fund ownership is 
associated with a 0.13–0.16 standard deviation (i.e., 1.6–2.0 percentage point) decline in the likelihood of 
hedge fund activism.  This magnitude is large given that a firm’s likelihood of an activism event in a 
given year in our sample is, on average, only 1.6%.22  
While the observed decline in activism by non-passive institutions is consistent with passive 
investors successfully affecting governance outcomes and reducing the need for activism by others, it 
does not negate the possibility that the concentration of passive institutions’ ownership stakes increases 
the threat of activism by others, or that this threat increases the influence of passive investors’ “voice.”  
Concerned about an increased threat of activism, managers might be particularly responsive to the views 
of passive investors and be taking actions to preempt an actual activist campaign.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that informal discussions between passive institutions and managers, backed up with the threat 
of voice, are often used to exert influence.23  
 
6. Do passive investors affect firm performance, compensation, or other corporate policies? 
 Ownership by passive investors might also be associated with differences in firm performance, 
managerial compensation, or corporate policies.  Overall performance or corporate policies might differ if 
the observed differences in governance associated with passive investors help mitigate managerial agency 
conflicts or if managers adjust corporate policies so as to preempt hedge fund activism campaigns that 
																																								 																				
21 We thank Alon Brav for making these data on hedge fund activism events available to us.  The database 
is an updated sample [1994‒2011] using the same data collection procedure and estimation methods as in Brav et al. 
(2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010).  For more information on how the database is constructed, please see 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~brav/HFactivism_SEPTEMBER_2013.pdf.  
22 In further support that the observed differences in governance are not driven by an increase in activism 
by other, non-passive investors, we find no evidence that firms with greater passive ownership are more likely to be 
the target of a takeover attempt, another mechanism by which activists might exercise influence. 
23 Glenn Booraem, controller of Vanguard funds, notes that engagement with directors and management of 
companies is a key component of Vanguard’s governance program, and that Vanguard has “found through hundreds 
of discussions every year” that it is “frequently able to accomplish as much—or more—through dialogue” as 
through voting (see Booream, 2013).  And in a speech from October 2014, the CEO and Chairman of the Vanguard 
group, F. William McNabb, noted that Vanguard sent out 923 letters to firms in 2013, 358 of which requested 
specific changes in governance, and that 80 of these companies had adopted substantive changes without having to 
go through a shareholder proposal (see McNabb, 2014).  Earlier findings regarding activism by TIAA-CREF also 
confirm the importance and impact of such private negotiations (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998). 
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rely on the support of passive investors. We now explore this possibility.      
 
6.1. Overall performance  
There is considerable debate about the value implications of various governance structures or 
whether the potential influence of passive investors will necessarily improve firm performance.  Because 
greater board independence, fewer takeover defenses, and equal voting rights arguably increase 
shareholder rights, one might expect that passive ownership mitigates agency conflicts and is associated 
with improved performance. However, theory suggests that board independence might be a result rather 
than a cause of performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), and the empirical evidence regarding the 
performance implications of board independence is mixed (e.g., Bhagat and Black, 2002; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003).  Likewise, the value implication of removing poison pills and other takeover defenses is 
debatable (e.g., Stein, 1988; Coates, 2000). More broadly, one might also argue that the optimal 
governance structure might vary considerably across firms (e.g., Coles, Daniel, Naveen, 2008; Duchin, 
Matsusaka, Ozbas, 2010), and hence, the potential “one-size-fits-all” governance view of passive 
investors might not always represent an improvement for individual firms.  
Consistent with the governance structure promoted by passive investors having a positive impact 
on performance for the average firm, we find evidence that ownership by passive funds is related to an 
overall improvement in firms’ future performance, as measured using firms’ ROA. Although passive fund 
ownership is not associated with significant differences in firms’ overall ROA in our main specification 
(Table 10, columns 1‒3), it is positively associated with firms’ ROA after adding controls for whether a 
firm switched indexes that particular year (columns 4‒6).  This is likely because improvements in 
performance can take time to manifest, and one would not expect to find a relation between changes in 
passive fund ownership and performance for firms that just switched indexes.  Consistent with this, we 
find that adding controls for such recent movers reveals a positive and statistically significant association 
between passive ownership and ROA.  On average, a one standard deviation increase in passive fund 
ownership is associated with about a 0.31–0.41 standard deviation increase in long-term ROA.  In 
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unreported estimates, we also find that passive fund ownership is positively associated with Tobin’s Q, 
another commonly used measure of firm performance.24  
 
6.2. Executive compensation 
There has been much debate regarding managerial pay and whether its growth reflects an efficient 
market outcome or an agency conflict, and passive investors commonly discuss the importance of the 
need to properly reward and incentivize managers while avoiding “excessive” pay [see McNabb (2014) 
and the Appendix]. To assess whether passive fund ownership affects CEO compensation structure, we 
examine total CEO pay, its composition, and the sensitivity of CEO pay to stock price movements.  
We find little evidence that ownership by passive funds is associated with a difference in overall 
managerial pay or its composition.  In unreported analysis, we find that while Passive% is negatively 
associated with total pay, the estimates are not statistically significant except in wider bandwidths. We 
also find little evidence that passive fund ownership is associated with differences in the composition of 
managerial pay (salary, bonuses, and grants of restricted stock, each scaled by total pay) or the sensitivity 
of pay to stock price movements [as measured using the delta or vega of the manager’s stock portfolio; 
see Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) for variable definitions]. Thus, for our sample at least, passive 
institutions appear to have relatively little impact on executive compensation. However, it is important to 
note that our sample predates the implementation of “Say on Pay” by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. This 
provision, which requires non-binding votes on executive pay packages, potentially provides an added 
mechanism for passive investors to influence compensation decisions. 
 
6.3. Cash, dividend, financing, and investment policies 
 There is an extensive literature addressing the relation between corporate ownership structure and 
corporate policies; for example, agency theories suggest that better monitoring by shareholders might lead 
to changes in leverage, acquisitions, cash levels, and payout policies (Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000).  
																																								 																				
 24 Similar to ROA, we find a positive association between passive ownership and Tobin’s Q only after 
controlling for whether a firm switched indexes that year. Importantly, our earlier estimates for governance and vote 
outcomes are unaffected by the inclusion of the additional controls for whether a firm switched indexes that year.  
These robustness tests are discussed in Section 7.1. 
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To examine whether ownership by passive mutual funds is associated with differences in these other 
corporate policies, we estimate Eq. (1) with standard measures of financing, investment, cash, and 
dividend policies as the outcome variable.   
   We find relatively little evidence that ownership by passive funds is associated with corporate 
policies related to investment, capital structure, or cash holdings.  In unreported results, we find no 
difference in firms’ leverage, capital expenditures, R&D expenses, cash-to-asset ratio, or acquisitions. 
These findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence that passive investors might lack the resources 
necessary to research and influence corporate policies that are inherently more firm-specific. We do, 
however, find weak evidence that passive ownership is associated with higher dividends.  In unreported 
analysis, we find that a one standard deviation increase in Passive% is associated with about a 0.15 
standard deviation increase in firms’ dividend yield (significant at the 10% level in some specifications).  
We find qualitatively similar results if we instead use a payout ratio and scale firms’ annual dividends by 
their net income, but the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
 
7. Additional robustness checks and choice of specification 
 In this section, we discuss the robustness of our IV estimates.  In particular, we demonstrate that 
our findings are not sensitive to how we measure end-of-May market caps, to adding additional controls, 
to varying the sample bandwidth around the threshold, to using alternative definitions of passive 
institutional ownership as our key explanatory variable, or to using end-of-May market cap rankings to 
select our sample of stocks each year. We also address the possibility of a selection bias around the 
Russell 1000/2000 threshold, particularly for the subsample of observations covered by ISS databases.  
 
7.1. Robustness to choice of controls, choice of bandwidth, and placebo tests 
 The assumption of our identification strategy is that after limiting the sample to stocks close to 
the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and controlling for the one factor that determines index membership (i.e., 
end-of-May market cap), index membership does not directly affect our outcomes except through its 
effect on passive ownership.  This is the exclusion restriction of the IV estimation. However, because 
Russell Investments uses a proprietary method to calculate firms’ total market caps, we are only able to 
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imperfectly control for the underlying market cap used to determine index assignment.25   
 Our findings, however, are robust to using alternative ways to measure firms’ end-of-May market 
cap.  In particular, using the noisy end-of-May market caps obtained directly from Russell to measure 
Mktcap does not affect our findings. This is shown in Appendix Table 4, where we re-estimate our main 
IV regressions for the period 1998‒2006 using the 250 bandwidth with third-order polynomial controls 
for Ln(Mktcap) after replacing the CRSP market cap with the Russell-provided market cap for the years 
2002‒2006.  The estimates are nearly the same as before.  Our findings are also robust to instead using 
the Compustat security monthly file to determine end-of-May market cap (see Appendix Table 5). 
 Our findings are also robust to including various controls. Adding two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) industry fixed effects to the specification does not affect our findings (see Appendix 
Table 6). Our findings are also largely unaffected if we add controls to account for firms that moved from 
the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 that year, and vice versa. If such switchers differ in other dimensions 
and represent a disproportionate share of either index, this could affect our earlier estimates.  However, all 
of the findings are robust to the inclusion of these controls (see Appendix Table 7).   In unreported 
analysis, we find that our estimates are unaffected by the inclusion of additional controls for a stock’s 
liquidity, such as the Amihud measure of illiquidity or a stock’s average bid-ask spread.  
Our estimates are also robust to our choice of bandwidth around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold.  
This is shown in Appendix Fig. 1, in which we plot the point estimates and 95th percentile confidence 
intervals when varying the bandwidth between 100 and 500 firms and using a first-order polynomial 
control for Ln(Mktcap); estimates are reported for both the first-stage and IV specifications of Tables 3‒
10. The estimates are relatively similar across the various bandwidths, and there is no evidence to indicate 
																																								 																				
25	 According to Russell’s documentation, their proprietary calculation of market capitalization includes 
some ownership stakes, like common stock, non-restricted exchangeable shares, and partnership units, but excludes 
other forms of shares, such as preferred stock or redeemable shares (Russell Investments, 2013). The share price 
chosen by Russell to compute market capitalization can also vary for firms that have multiple share classes or did 
not trade on the last day of May.  Similar to Mullins (2014), we contacted Russell Investments and were only able to 
obtain a noisy measure of their proprietary measure of market capitalizations for the years 2002 through 2006.  
Russell does not have the data prior to 2002. See Mullins (2014) for more details regarding the likely sources for this 
noise.	
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that our findings are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.  
Finally, in further support that our findings are not driven by omitted variables that might be 
correlated with firms’ end-of-May market cap, we do not find an association between passive ownership 
and our outcomes of interest in placebo IV or reduced-form tests that use alternative thresholds.  For 
example, if we restrict the sample to the top 500 firms of the Russell 2000, and replace our R2000 
indicator with an indicator for the bottom 250 firms of this subsample, our IV estimation does not detect 
an effect of passive ownership on any of our outcomes, nor do we find any of our findings in a reduced-
form estimation of the outcomes onto R2000.  Likewise, we do not find an effect of passive ownership in 
a similar placebo test that uses the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000. 
 
7.2. Robustness to alternative definitions of passive ownership 
For our analysis above, we measure the ownership stake of passive investors by summing up the 
ownership of mutual funds we classify as passively managed. A key advantage of using the Thomson 
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database is that it allows for a precise measure of passive ownership. 
A disadvantage of the fund-level data, however, is that it misses the holdings of passive 
institutional investors that do not manage mutual funds or Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs).  The Thomson 
Reuters S12 mutual fund data we use exclude holdings by banks, insurance companies, and pension 
funds, some of which might also adopt passive investment strategies.  While the exclusion of these 
passive institutions does not affect the validity of our IV estimation, it does mean one must be more 
careful in interpreting the IV point estimates.  In particular, attempting to back out the implied change in 
governance structure for a given percentage change in passive ownership might lead to an overestimation 
of the actual economic magnitude of interest.26  To avoid this potential concern, we scale our measure of 
Passive% by its sample standard deviation so that point estimates instead reflect the observed difference 
																																								 																				
26	 For example, if the reduced-form estimation of board independence detects a 4.87 percentage point 
increase in the share of directors classified as independent for stocks in the Russell 2000 and the first stage 
estimation detects a 0.94 percentage point increase in holdings by passively managed mutual funds, then the IV 
estimate for board independence will equal 4.87/0.94 = 5.18.  In other words, the IV estimate will indicate that a one 
percentage point change in passive ownership causes a 5.18 percentage point increase in board independence.  But if 
the true increase in passive ownership for stocks assigned to the Russell 2000, after accounting for passive investors 
not accounted for in the mutual fund data, is instead 2.1 percentage points, then the true effect of a one percentage 
point increase in passive ownership on board independence would be 4.87/2.1 = 2.32 percentage points.  	
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in governance for a one standard deviation difference in passive fund ownership.  Under the assumption 
that the standard deviation change in passive fund ownership for stocks assigned to the Russell 2000 
would be similar with the inclusion of any passive investors not captured by the S12 data, the point 
estimates we obtain in the scaled regression will accurately reflect the economic magnitude of interest.   
Using a broader measure of passive ownership, however, has no effect on our findings. To 
illustrate this, we obtain data on institutional holdings from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
(13F) Database.  Any financial institution exercising discretionary management of investment portfolios 
over $100 million in qualified securities is required to report its aggregate holdings quarterly to the SEC 
using Form 13F, and consistent with this capturing a larger share of institutional ownership than the S12 
data, we find that institutional holdings account for about 70% of market capitalization compared to the 
25% of market capitalization accounted for by mutual funds in the S12 data.  We then classify institutions 
as either passive or active using Bushee’s (2001) classification of institutions.  In particular, we classify 
“quasi-index” institutions as passive and “transient” or “dedicated” institutions as active.27  Using this 
alternative measure of passive and active ownership, we repeat our first-stage and IV estimations.  These 
estimates are reported in Tables 11 and 12.  As further evidence that only passive investors adjust their 
holdings to index assignment, our first-stage estimates only detect an increase in “quasi-index” ownership 
(which includes some of the largest passive investors, like Vanguard, State Street, and Barclay’s Bank) 
and no increase in “transient” or “dedicated” ownership.  Moreover, as shown in Table 12, our IV 
estimates when using Quasi-index% remain qualitatively similar.28 
Our findings are also robust to using alternative definitions of passive investors.  In particular, if 
																																								 																				
27 To avoid changes in the classification of an institution over time, we use Bushee’s “permanent” 
classification.  Our findings, however, are similar if we do not use Bushee’s “permanent” classification and instead 
use the time-varying classifications provided by Bushee or restrict the measure of passive ownership to institutions 
that are classified as a quasi-indexer in every year of our sample period.	
28 Similar to before, one must be cautious in interpreting the economic magnitudes of these estimates.  
Because the Bushee (2001) “quasi-index” classification includes some active investors and actively managed mutual 
funds, the first-stage estimates for the implied standard deviation change in Quasi-index% likely understate the true 
standard deviation change in passive holdings. In particular, the 2.3 percentage point increase in quasi-index 
holdings found in Table 11, column 2 corresponds to about a 0.14 standard deviation change in Quasi-index%, 
which is considerably smaller than the 0.5 standard deviation change detected when using a more precise measure of 
passive holdings.  This smaller first-stage estimate will cause the IV estimates to be inflated when using Quasi-
index% scaled by its sample standard deviation as the explanatory variable to be instrumented.    
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we instead measure passive ownership as just the sum of 13F holdings by Barclays Bank, State Street, 
and Vanguard, we get similar findings.  In unreported first-stage estimates, we find that being assigned to 
the Russell 2000 is associated with a very large and statistically significant increase in the combined 
holdings of these three passive institutions; they account for more than half of the increase in Quasi-index 
ownership shown in Table 11. Moreover, our IV estimations remain large and statistically significant 
when we use the combined ownership of these three firms as the explanatory variable instead of all quasi-
index ownership. This can be seen in Appendix Table 8. These findings provide additional confidence 
that our earlier estimates are capturing the influence of passive investors and that the IV estimation is not 
sensitive to how we measure passive ownership. 
 
7.3. Robustness to alternative sampling choices 
In our main analysis, we select our sample to be the 250 stocks with the smallest portfolio 
weights in the Russell 1000 and the 250 stocks with the largest portfolio weights in the Russell 2000.  Our 
findings, however, are not sensitive to instead using end-of-May market caps to determine the sample of 
stocks each year.  In particular, we can instead rank stocks based on their end-of-May market cap, as 
calculated using CRSP, and select the sample for each year of the sample using firms ranked 750th 
through 1,250th that year.  An advantage of this latter approach is that it eliminates the risk that Russell’s 
float-adjusted reweighting of stocks within an index affects our findings. A disadvantage of this approach, 
however, is that we are no longer necessarily comparing the very bottom firms of the Russell 1000 against 
the very top firms of the Russell 2000, which is where we would expect to find the biggest difference in 
passive ownership (and hence, outcomes) to occur. This sampling choice, however, has little impact on 
our IV estimates.  While the first-stage estimates are expectedly smaller in magnitude when we use end-
of-May market caps to rank stocks and select our sample each year (coefficient = 0.383, t-stat = 9.54), the 
IV estimations are largely unchanged (see Appendix Table 9). 
 
7.4. Ruling out potential sample selection biases 
 One potential concern with our analysis is the possibility of systematic differences (beyond 
36
 
 
market capitalization, which we control for) in the type of stocks on the two sides of the Russell 
1000/2000 threshold. For example, one might worry that “fallen angels” (stocks experiencing significant 
declines in stock price) are more likely to appear in the Russell 2000, while “rising stars” (stocks 
experiencing significant increases in stock price) are more likely to appear in the Russell 1000. 
Additionally, this concern could be particularly relevant for our analysis that uses the ISS data, which is 
largely limited to firms in the S&P 1500, if there are systematic differences in the likelihood of fallen 
angels or rising stars from the Russell 2000 sample being included in the S&P 1500 (and hence, in the 
ISS sample) relative to the likelihood of fallen angels or rising stars from the Russell 1000 sample being 
included in the S&P 1500. If present, such difference could cause a violation of the exclusion restriction.     
 However, we do not find significant evidence of differences in the lagged returns (prior to 
reconstitution) between the stocks on different sides of the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. Specifically, we 
find no evidence that “fallen angels” or “rising stars” are disproportionately represented in either index, 
including the subsample covered by ISS. To show this, we create indicator variables for “rising stars” and 
“fallen angels” that equals one if a stock’s return is in the top or bottom 5% of the sample for the 12 
months before reconstitution (i.e., end-of-May in year t-1 to end-of-May in year t), respectively. We do 
not find statistically significant differences in the proportion of fallen angels and rising stars in the Russell 
1000 versus the Russell 2000, either in the full sample or in the sample of observations covered by ISS. 
Moreover, we do not find evidence of a significant difference in either the lagged stock return or lagged 
change in stocks’ end-of-May market cap ranking between the stocks on either side of the Russell 
1000/2000 threshold for the sample observations covered by ISS.  While there is evidence in the full 
sample that stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 have higher average lagged stock returns, our main 
second-stage results are robust to controlling for past stock price returns (see Appendix Table 10) or other 
indicators for a large change in market cap over the past year. 
Finally, any selection into the ISS database based on dual class share structures cannot easily 
explain our findings regarding dual class structures. Since S&P requires firms to have a public float of at 
least 50% of the stock to be added to the S&P 1500, companies with dual class structures might be less 
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likely to be included in the S&P 1500. However, because our analysis is limited to the subsample of firms 
covered by ISS, our estimates indicate that among firms covered by ISS, more passive ownership is 
associated with a firm being less likely to have a dual class share structure.  In other words, any type of 
selection (if it existed) would not be a problem for our analysis.   
 
8. Conclusion 
 Institutions that manage passive funds, like Vanguard and State Street, are an increasingly 
important component of U.S. stock ownership, and the impact of their growth on firm-level governance is 
widely debated. Despite arguments that they might be lazy investors that lack both the motivation and 
resources to monitor managers, there are multiple reasons why passive investors might have a vested 
interest in affecting firms’ governance structures and performance and why their large ownership stakes 
might make them an influential voice in decisions pertaining to firms’ governance structures. 
To examine whether passively managed mutual funds affect firms’ governance, and if so, by 
which mechanisms, we exploit variation in passive institutional ownership that occurs around the cutoff 
used to construct the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes. Benchmarking to these indexes leads to 
about a 66% difference in passive ownership for stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to stocks at 
the bottom of the Russell 1000.  Thus, we instrument passive institutional ownership with an indicator for 
being assigned to the Russell 2000 in a given year and analyze the influence of passive investors in an 
economically important sample of large U.S. publicly listed firms.  Our instrumental variable estimation 
relies on the assumption that after conditioning on firms’ market capitalization, which determines index 
assignment, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index does not directly affect our governance or corporate 
outcomes except through its impact on ownership by passive investors.   
Our findings suggest that while passive institutional investors are not active owners in the 
traditional sense of accumulating or selling shares in a target company with the express purpose of 
influencing management, they are not passive owners either. In particular, we find that ownership by 
passively managed mutual funds is associated with more independent directors on a board, fewer takeover 
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defenses, and more equal voting rights, as captured by a firm being less likely to have a dual class share 
structure. The observed differences in actual governance structures suggest that passive institutions are 
attentive to firms’ corporate governance, and that they use their large voting blocs to exercise voice and 
exert influence. For example, we find that higher passive fund ownership is associated with less support 
for management proposals and greater support for shareholder-initiated governance proposals. 
Engagement by passive mutual funds also appears to reduce the need for activism by other, non-passive 
investors; we find that companies with greater passive fund ownership exhibit improvements in long-term 
performance and are less likely to be targeted for activism by a hedge fund.  
Our findings, however, do not resolve the ongoing debate regarding the value implications of 
various governance structures, including board independence, takeover defenses, and equal voting rights 
for shareholders, and whether the optimal governance structure might vary across firms in ways that do 
not always conform to the proxy-voting guidelines of the largest passive institutions. The findings also do 
not address whether passive investors attempt to determine the individual governance needs of each 
company in their large portfolios or instead follow a “check the box” approach to governance. While 
some large passive investors do vary their voting strategies across firms in ways that are not consistent 
with such a one-size-fits-all approach to governance (Davis and Kim, 2007), additional analysis regarding 
these questions would seem to be a promising direction for further research.  
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Appendix A. Excerpts from fund governance/voting policies   
 In this appendix, we provide excerpts from the historical voting policies of various institutional 
investors that offer index-related investment products. These proxy-voting policies were all obtained from 
fund prospectuses issued in late 2003 and early 2004 shortly after the SEC first required the filing of such 
voting policies on July 1, 2003. Four common themes of these governance/voting policies are (1) to 
withhold support or vote against boards that are not sufficiently independent, (2) broadly oppose takeover 
defenses, like poison pills, restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting, and classified 
boards, (3) oppose unequal voting rights (i.e., dual class share structures), and (4) push for executive 
compensation that is tied to performance but not excessive.    
 
A.1. iShares: Proxy Voting Guidelines29  
 
“The Company has adopted as its proxy voting policies the proxy voting guidelines of BGFA [Barclays 
Global Fund Advisors], the investment advisor to each Fund. The Company has delegated to BGFA the 
responsibility for voting proxies on the portfolio securities held by each Fund. Therefore, the remainder of 
this section discusses BGFA’s proxy voting guidelines… 
  
When voting proxies, BGFA attempts to ensure that companies follow practices that advance their 
economic value and allow the market to place a proper value on their assets. With respect to certain 
specific issues: 
  
• BGFA generally supports management in the election of directors and generally supports 
proposals that strengthen the independence of boards of directors; 
• BGFA generally does not support proposals on social issues that lack a demonstrable economic 
benefit to the issuer and the Fund investing in such issuer; and 
• BGFA generally votes against anti-takeover proposals and proposals which would create 
additional barriers or costs to corporate transactions.” 
 
A.2. State Street Global Advisors: Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures30 
 
“For most issues and in most circumstances, we abide by the following general guidelines…  
 
FM votes in support of management on the following ballot items… 
 
• Elimination of cumulative voting… 
• Capitalization changes which eliminate other classes of stock and voting rights… 
• Elimination of pre-emptive rights for share issuance of less than a given percentage (country 
specific - ranging from 5% to 20%) of the outstanding shares 
• Elimination of "poison pill" rights… 
																																								 																				
29 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/930667/000119312503100400/d485bpos.txt  
30 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/826686/000104746904004745/a2128691z485bpos.txt  
40
 
 
• Stock option plans which are incentive based and not excessive 
• Other stock-based plans which are appropriately structured 
• Reductions in super-majority vote requirements… 
 
FM votes against management on the following items… 
 
• Capitalization changes that add "blank check" classes of stock or classes that dilute the voting 
interests of existing shareholders… 
• Anti-takeover and related provisions that serve to prevent the majority of shareholders from 
exercising their rights or effectively deter appropriate tender offers and other offers 
• Amendments to bylaws which would require super-majority shareholder votes to pass or repeal 
certain provisions 
• Elimination of Shareholders' Right to Call Special Meetings 
• Establishment of classified boards of directors… 
• Shareholder rights plans that allow the board of directors to block appropriate offers to 
shareholders or which trigger provisions preventing legitimate offers from proceeding 
• Excessive compensation… 
• Proposals requesting re-election of insiders or affiliated directors who serve on audit, 
compensation, and nominating committees… 
 
FM votes in support of shareholders on the following ballot items… 
 
• Establishment of an annual election of the board of directors 
• Mandates requiring a majority of independent directors on the Board of Directors and the audit, 
nominating, and compensation committees… 
• Mandates that shareholder-rights plans be put to a vote or repealed… 
• Repeals of various anti-takeover related provisions 
• Reduction or elimination of super-majority vote requirements…” 
 
A.3. Vanguard: Proxy Voting Guidelines31 
 
“The Board of Trustees (the Board) of each Vanguard fund that invests in stocks has adopted proxy 
voting procedures and guidelines to govern proxy voting by the fund. The Board has delegated day-to-day 
oversight of proxy voting to the Proxy Oversight Committee (the Committee), comprised of senior 
Vanguard officers and subject to the operating procedures and guidelines described below…  
 
I. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS    
 
A. ELECTION OF DIRECTORS   
 
We believe that good governance starts with a majority-independent board, whose key committees 
are comprised entirely of independent directors. As such, companies should attest to the independence 
of directors who serve on the Compensation, Nominating and Audit committees… 
 
We will generally support proposals to declassify existing boards (whether proposed by management 
or shareholders), and will block efforts by companies to adopt classified board structures, in which 
only part of the board is elected each year. 
 
																																								 																				
31 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105563/000093247104000415/wellington485b032004.txt 	
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II. APPROVAL OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS   
 
We believe that the relationship between the company and its auditors should be limited primarily to 
the audit, although it may include certain closely related activities that do not, in the aggregate, raise 
any appearance of impaired independence. We will generally support management's recommendation 
for the ratification of the auditor, except in instances where audit and audit-related fees make up less 
than 50% of the total fees paid by the company to the audit firm. We will evaluate on a case-by-case 
basis instances in which the audit firm has a substantial non-audit relationship with the company 
(regardless of its size relative to the audit fee) to determine whether we believe independence has 
been compromised.   
 
III. COMPENSATION ISSUES   
 
A. STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION PLANS   
 
We believe that appropriately designed stock-based compensation plans, administered by an 
independent committee of the board and approved by shareholders, can be an effective way to 
align the interests of long-term shareholders and the interests of management, employees, and 
directors. Conversely, we oppose plans that substantially dilute our ownership interest in the 
company, provide participants with excessive awards, or have inherently objectionable structural 
features… 
 
IV. CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS   
 
We believe the exercise of shareholder rights, in proportion to economic ownership, to be a 
fundamental privilege of stock ownership that should not be unnecessarily limited. Such limits may 
be placed on shareholders' ability to act by corporate charter or by-law provisions, or by the adoption 
of certain takeover provisions. We believe that, in general, the market for corporate control should be 
allowed to function without undue interference from these artificial barriers.    
 
Our positions on a number of the most commonly presented issues in this area are as follows:   
 
A. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLANS (POISON PILLS)   
 
A company's adoption of a so-called poison pill effectively limits a potential acquirer's ability to 
buy a controlling interest without the approval of the target's board of directors. Such a plan, in 
conjunction with other takeover defenses, may serve to entrench incumbent management and 
directors…  
 
B. CUMULATIVE VOTING   
 
We are generally opposed to cumulative voting under the premise that it allows shareholders a 
voice in director elections that is disproportionate to their economic investment in the 
corporation.   
 
C. SUPERMAJORITY VOTE REQUIREMENTS   
 
We support shareholders' ability to approve or reject matters presented for a vote based on a 
simple majority. Accordingly, we will support proposals to remove supermajority requirements 
and oppose proposals to impose them.   
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D. RIGHT TO CALL MEETINGS AND ACT BY WRITTEN CONSENT   
 
We support shareholders' right to call special meetings of the board (for good cause and with 
ample representation) and to act by written consent. We will generally vote for proposals to grant 
these rights to shareholders and against proposals to abridge them.   
 
E. CONFIDENTIAL VOTING   
 
We believe that the integrity of the voting process is enhanced substantially when shareholders 
(both institutions and individuals) can vote without fear of coercion or retribution based on their 
votes. As such, we support proposals to provide confidential voting.   
 
F. DUAL CLASSES OF STOCK   
 
We are opposed to dual class capitalization structures that provide disparate voting rights to 
different groups of shareholders with similar economic investments. As such, we will oppose the 
creation of separate classes with different voting rights and will support the dissolution of such 
classes.   
 
V. CORPORATE AND SOCIAL POLICY ISSUES   
 
Proposals in this category, initiated primarily by shareholders, typically request that the company disclose 
or amend certain business practices. We generally believe that these are "ordinary business matters" that 
are primarily the responsibility of management and should be evaluated and approved solely by the 
corporation's board of directors. Often, proposals may address concerns with which we philosophically 
agree, but absent a compelling economic impact on shareholder value (e.g., proposals to require 
expensing of stock options), we will typically abstain from voting on these proposals. This reflects our 
belief that regardless of our philosophical perspective on the issue, these decisions should be the province 
of company management unless they have a significant, tangible impact on the value of our investment 
and, we don't view management as responsive to the matter.” 
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Fig. 1. Growth of passive investors, 1998–2014. This figure plots the estimated 
percent of all U.S. equity mutual fund assets under management between 1998 and 
2014 that are held in passively managed funds and the estimated percent of total U.S. 
market capitalization held by passively managed mutual funds.  We construct the 
figure by matching the S12 mutual fund holdings data compiled in the Thomson 
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database to market caps reported in CRSP and fund 
names in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. We use a name-parsing procedure along 
with the index fund identifier from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database to classify 
mutual funds as passively managed. Our procedure is described in Section 2.1 of the 
text. Holdings and market cap are calculated each year at the end of the third quarter. 
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Fig. 2. Portfolio weights in the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes by within-index ranking for 
the year 2006. This figure plots the portfolio weights of the bottom 500 firms in the Russell 
1000 index and the top 500 firms in the Russell 2000 index for the end-of-June 2006.  
Observations are ordered by their within-index ranking such that rankings of 1 and 1,000 
represent the firms with the largest and 1,000th largest portfolio weight in the index, 
respectively.  The portfolio weights are given as a percent. 
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Fig. 3. Market capitalization, index assignment, and passive ownership by market 
capitalization rankings for the bottom 500 firms of Russell 1000 and top 500 firms of 
Russell 2000. This figure plots the average end-of-May Ln(Market capitalization), 
fraction of firm-year observations in the Russell 2000, and passive mutual fund 
ownership (%) by ranking, where ranking is determined using end-of-May market 
capitalization, as reported in CRSP.  The sample includes the bottom 500 firms of the 
Russell 1000 and the top 500 firms of the Russell 2000, as determined using end-of-
June Russell-assigned portfolio weights for each index.  Passive mutual fund 
ownership is calculated as of September each year, and all averages are calculated 
using bins of ten firms and data from 1998–2006. For the passive ownership panel, we 
scale the vertical axis to report a standard deviation on each side of the sample mean.   
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Fig. 4. Active and unclassified mutual fund ownership by market capitalization 
rankings for the bottom 500 firms of Russell 1000 and top 500 firms of Russell 2000. 
This figure plots the average unclassified and active mutual fund ownership (%) by 
ranking, where ranking is determined using end-of-May market capitalization, as 
reported in CRSP.  The sample includes the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000 
and the top 500 firms of the Russell 2000, as determined using end-of-June Russell-
assigned portfolio weights for each index.  Mutual fund ownership is calculated as of 
September each year, and all averages are calculated using bins of ten firms and data 
from 1998–2006. For each ownership panel, we scale the vertical axis to report a 
standard deviation on each side of the sample mean.   
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Obs. Mean Median SD
Total mutual fund ownership % 4,415 25.2 25.0 12.9
Passive ownership % 4,415 3.0 2.6 2.3
Active ownership % 4,415 18.9 18.1 10.9
Unclassified ownership % 4,415 3.2 2.5 2.9
Independent director % 2,871 65.1 66.7 18.1
Poison pill removal 2,957 0.04 0 0.19
Greater ability to call special meeting 1,858 0.006 0 0.08
Indicator for dual class shares 1,858 0.13 0 0.33
Mngt. proposal support % 1,288 84.7 87.2 11.9
Shareholder gov. proposal support % 202 36.3 31.5 22.8
Indicator for hedge fund activism 4,415 0.016 0 0.12
ROA 4,291 0.03 0.04 0.11
This table reports summary statistics of our key variables for our main
sample: firms in the 250 bandwidth around the cutoff between the Russell
1000 and 2000 indexes from 1998–2006. Definitions for all variables are
provided in Appendix Table 1. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1%
level, and we delete observations where either mutual fund ownership is
missing or total mutual fund holdings exceed a stock's market capitalization.
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Table 2
Impact of index assignment on mutual fund ownership 
All            
mutual                
funds
Passive Active Unclassified
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R2000 1.216* 1.086*** 0.118 0.012
(0.662) (0.067) (0.604) (0.135)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654
Observations 4,415 4,415 4,415 4,415
R-squared 0.21 0.62 0.12 0.09
This table reports estimates of a regression of mutual fund holdings on an indicator for
membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  Specifically, we estimate
period using a polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap) of N = 3. Standard errors, ε, are
clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The symbols * and *** indicate
significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.                                                                                                                                                                       
Dependent variable =
Percent of firm's common shares held by:
where R2000it is a dummy variable equal to one if stock i is in the Russell 2000 index at end
of June in year t, Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31
in year t, N is the polynomial order we use to control for Ln(Mktcapit), Floatit is the float-
adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t, and δt are year
fixed effects. Ownership%it measures mutual fund ownership (in percent) for stock i at the
end of September in year t. In this table we use four different definitions for Ownership% for
stock i: (1) the percentage of shares outstanding owned by all mutual funds (from S12
filings); (2) the percentage of shares outstanding owned by “passive” funds; (3) the
percentage of shares outstanding owned by “active” mutual funds; and (4) the percentage of
shares outstanding owned by “unclassified” mutual funds. The mutual fund classifications
are defined in Section 2.1 of the text. The sample consists of the top 250 firms in the Russell
2000 index and bottom 250 firms of the Russell 1000 index (i.e., bandwidth = 250) for which
we obtain holdings data from Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database and which
we match with data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998–2006                                                                                                                                                                   
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Table 3
First-stage estimation for ownership by passively managed funds
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3)
R2000 0.505*** 0.512*** 0.473***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Bandwidth 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,654 1,654 1,654
Observations 4,415 4,415 4,415
R-squared 0.61 0.62 0.62
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of passive
ownership onto an indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus
additional controls.  Specifically, we estimate
Ln(Mktcap) of N = 1, 2, and 3. Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm
level and reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Passive % scaled by its                                      
sample standard deviation 
where R2000it is a dummy variable equal to one if stock i is in the Russell
2000 index at end of June in year t, Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of
equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t, Floatit is the float-adjusted
market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t, and δt are
year fixed effects. Passive%it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned
by passively managed mutual funds, as defined in Section 2.1 of the text, for
stock i at the end of September in year t scaled by its sample standard
deviation. The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for which we
obtain holdings data from Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database
and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is
estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around
the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for
aaaaaaaaaaaa aaa aaa 
 
Passive%it =η + λR2000it + χn Ln(Mktcapit )( )n
n=1
N
∑ +σLn(Float )it +δ t + uit ,
55
Table 4
Ownership by passive investors and board independence
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3)
Passive % 0.729*** 0.762*** 0.654***
(0.160) (0.162) (0.159)
Bandwidth 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,082 1,082 1,082
Observations 2,871 2,871 2,871
This table reports estimates of our instrumental variable estimation
used to identify the effect of ownership by passive investors on board
independence.  Specifically, we estimate
polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap) of N = 1, 2, and 3. Standard
errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level.
Independent director %
where Yit is the percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i 
in year t (from Riskmetrics) scaled by its sample standard deviation,
Passive%it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by passively
managed funds (as defined in the text) for stock i at the end of September
in year t scaled by its sample standard deviation, Mktcapit is the CRSP
market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t, Floatit is
the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30
in year t, and δt are year fixed effects. We instrument Passive% in the
above estimation using R2000it, an indicator equal to one if firm i is part
of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The data consist of firms in the two
Russell indexes for which we obtain holdings data from Thomson
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database and which we match with data
from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006
period using 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and
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Table 5
Passive ownership and board independence, pre- versus post-2002 rule change
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Passive % 1.314*** 1.461*** 1.257*** 0.354*** 0.324** 0.264*
(0.298) (0.303) (0.297) (0.136) (0.137) (0.160)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 882 882 882 549 549 549
Observations 1,682 1,682 1,682 1,189 1,189 1,189
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable
estimation used to identify the effect of passive investors on the percentage of independent board
directors both before and after the 2002 change in exchange-listing requirements regarding board
independence. The estimation is the same as in Table 4, except we now separately estimate the
model over the 1998–2002 and 2003–2006 time periods using a bandwidth of 250 firms around
the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap) of N = 1, 2, and
3. Both the dependent variable and Passive% are scaled by their sample standard deviations.
Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
 Independent director %
Sample years = 1998–2002 Sample years = 2003–2006
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Table 6
Ownership by passive investors and takeover defenses
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Passive % 0.176*** 0.181*** 0.203*** 0.304*** 0.310*** 0.341***
(0.0647) (0.0650) (0.0741) (0.0999) (0.108) (0.114)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,050 1,050 1,050
Observations 2,957 2,957 2,957 1,858 1,858 1,858
This table reports estimates of our instrumental variable estimation used to identify the effect of
institutional ownership by passive investors on takeover defense outcomes.  Specifically, we estimate
threshold and first-, second-, and third-order polynomial controls for Ln(Mktcap). Standard errors, ε, 
are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1% levels.
Poison pill removal Greater ability to                                  call special meeting
where Yit is the governance variable for firm i in year t scaled by its sample standard deviation,
Passive%it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by passively managed mutual funds (as
defined in Section 2.1 of the text) for stock i at the end of September in year t scaled by its sample
standard deviation, Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year
t, Floatit is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t, and δt 
are year fixed effects. The governance variables investigated in this table, from Shark Repellent
(FactSet) and Riskmetrics, are: an indicator for either the withdrawal or expiration (without renewal)
of a poison pill in year t, and an indicator for there being fewer restrictions on shareholders' ability to
call a special meeting in year t. We instrument Passive% in the above estimation using R2000it, an
indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The data consist of firms in
the two Russell indexes for which we obtain holdings data from Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund
Holdings Database and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is
estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000
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Table 7
Ownership by passive investors and dual class share structures
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3)
Passive % -0.886*** -1.031*** -1.005***
(0.179) (0.167) (0.181)
Bandwidth 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,050 1,050 1,050
Observations 1,858 1,858 1,858
This table reports estimates of our instrumental variable estimation
used to identify the effect of passive investors on the likelihood of dual
class shares.  Specifically, we estimate
1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap) of N =
1, 2, and 3. Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and reported
in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Indicator for dual class shares
where Yit is an indicator equal to one if firm i has dual class shares in year t 
according to Riskmetrics scaled by its sample standard deviation,
Passive%it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by passively
managed mutual funds (as defined in Section 2.1 of the text) for stock i at
the end of September in year t scaled by its sample standard deviation,
Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31
in year t, Floatit is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by
Russell) at June 30 in year t, and δt are year fixed effects. We instrument
Passive% in the above estimation using R2000it, an indicator equal to one
if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The data consist of
firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain holdings data from
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database and which we match
with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the
1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell
aaaaaaaaaa aaaa
 
Yit =α + βPassive%it + θn Ln(Mktcapit )( )n
n=1
N
∑ + γ Ln(Float )it +δ t + ε it ,
59
Table 8
Ownership by passive investors and shareholder support for proposals
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Passive % -0.783***-0.745***-0.734*** 0.492** 0.649* 0.622*
(0.180) (0.179) (0.231) (0.247) (0.348) (0.336)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 775 775 775 127 127 127
Observations 1,288 1,288 1,288 202 202 202
This table reports estimates of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect
of passive investors on shareholder support for management proposals and shareholder-initiated
governance proposals.  Specifically, we estimate
around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap) of N =
1, 2, and 3. Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The
symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
 Management                                     
proposal support %
Governance                                       
proposal support %
where Yit is either the average percentage of shareholders that vote along with management
proposals at annual meetings for firm i in year t (from Riskmetrics) or the average percentage of
shareholders that vote in support of a shareholder-initiated governance proposal for firm i in
year t (from Riskmetrics) each scaled by their sample standard deviation, Passive%it is the
percentage of shares outstanding owned by passively managed mutual funds (as defined in
Section 2.1 of the text) for stock i at the end of September in year t scaled by its sample
standard deviation, Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31
in year t, Floatit is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in
year t, and δt are year fixed effects. We instrument Passive% in the above estimation using
R2000it, an indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The data
consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain holdings data from Thomson
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database and which we match with data from the monthly
CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms
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Table 9
Ownership by passive investors and hedge fund activism
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3)
Passive % -0.131* -0.130* -0.162**
(0.0721) (0.0718) (0.0805)
Bandwidth 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,654 1,654 1,654
Observations 4,415 4,415 4,415
This table reports estimates of our instrumental variable estimation used to
identify the effect of ownership by passive investors on the likelihood of hedge
fund activism.  Specifically, we estimate
threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap) of N = 1, 2, and 3.
Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The
symbols * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Indicator for hedge fund activism event
where Yit is an indicator equal to one if firm i experiences a hedge fund activism
event in year t, as defined in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Brav,
Jiang, and Kim (2010), scaled by its sample standard deviation, Passive%it is the
percentage of shares outstanding owned by passively managed mutual funds (as
defined in Section 2.1 of the text) for stock i at the end of September in year t 
scaled by its sample standard deviation, Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of
equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t, Floatit is the float-adjusted market
value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t, and δt are year fixed
effects. We instrument Passive% in the above estimation using R2000it, an
indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The data
consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain holdings data
from Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database and which we match
with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the
1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000
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Table 10
Ownership by passive investors and firms' return on assets
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Passive % -0.028 -0.015 0.035 0.304*** 0.310*** 0.414***
(0.098) (0.093) (0.105) (0.111) (0.106) (0.121)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for movers no no no yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Observations 4,291 4,291 4,291 4,291 4,291 4,291
This table reports estimates of our instrumental variable estimation used to identify the
effect of ownership by passive institutional investors on firms' performance, as measured
using firms' return on assets (ROA).  Specifically, we estimate
and third-order polynomial controls for Ln(Mktcap). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the
firm level and reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
ROA
where Yit is the ROA for firm i in year t scaled by its sample standard deviation, Passive%it is
the percentage of shares outstanding owned by passively managed mutual funds (as defined
in Section 2.1 of the text) for stock i at the end of September in year t scaled by its sample
standard deviation, Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May
31 in year t, Floatit is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June
30 in year t, and δt are year fixed effects. We instrument Passive% in the above estimation
using R2000it, an indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t.  
The specification in columns 1–3 is the same as in earlier tables, but in columns 4–6, we add
two additional controls to the specification: an indicator that equals one for firms that are in
the Russell 2000 index in year t but were in the Russell 1000 in year t-1, and an indicator that
equals one for firms that are in the Russell 1000 index in year t but were in the Russell 2000
index in year t-1. The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain
holdings data from Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database and which we match
with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period
using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and first-, second-,
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Table 11
Impact of index assignment on institution-level (13F) stock ownership 
All 
institutions
Quasi-             
index Dedicated Transient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R2000 1.354 2.381*** -0.539 -0.445
(1.517) (0.748) (0.891) (0.845)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,633 1,633 1,633 1,633
Observations 4,357 4,357 4,357 4,357
R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.02 0.09
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of institutional
holdings on an indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional
controls.  Specifically, we estimate
for Ln(Mktcap) of N = 3. Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and
reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Dependent variable =
Percent of firm's common shares held by:
where R2000it is a dummy variable equal to one if stock i is in the Russell 2000 index
at end of June in year t, Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i 
measured at May 31 in year t, N is the polynomial order we use to control for
Ln(Mktcapit), Floatit is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by
Russell) at June 30 in year t, and δt are year fixed effects. Ownership%it measures
institution-level (13F) ownership (in percent) for stock i at the end of September in
year t. In this table we use four different definitions for Ownership% for stock i: (1)
the percentage of shares outstanding owned by all institutional investors; (2) the
percentage of shares outstanding owned by "quasi-index" institutions, as classified by
Bushee (2001); (3) the percentage of shares outstanding owned by "dedicated"
institutions as classified by Bushee; and (4) the percentage of shares outstanding
owned by “transient” institutions as classified by Bushee. The Bushee classifications
are defined in Section 7.2 of the text. The sample consists of the top 250 firms in the
Russell 2000 index and bottom 250 firms of the Russell 1000 index (i.e., bandwidth
= 250) for which we obtain holdings data from Thomson Reuters Institutional
Holdings (13F) Database and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file.
The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a polynomial order control
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Table 12
Robustness of IV estimates to using passive indicator based on institution-level (13F) stock ownership
Dep. variable = 
Ind.                 
directors        
%
Poison             
pill            
removal
Ability to 
call special 
meeting
Ind. for             
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support % 
Gov. 
proposal 
support %
HF               
activism 
event
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quasi-index % 1.197*** 0.885* 0.958** -2.866** -1.148** 1.297* -0.580* 1.803**
(0.388) (0.479) (0.473) (1.170) (0.516) (0.680) (0.336) (0.899)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,073 1,160 1,047 1,047 768 125 1,633 1,586
Observations 2,840 2,940 1,847 1,847 1,279 200 4,357 4,246
passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional controls for recent movers, used in columns 4–6 of
Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The
symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of
institutional ownership by passive investors on our governance and corporate outcome variables where passive ownership is
measured using the percentage of stock held by "quasi-index" institutions, as classified by Bushee (2001) and defined in Section
7.2 of the text. The estimation and outcomes are the same as in Tables 4–10, except Passive% is replaced by Quasi-index%, the 
share of market cap held by quasi-index institutions scaled by its sample standard deviation. The dependent variables are defined in
Appendix Table 1, and the model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell
aaaaaaaaa aaaaa1000/2000 threshold and a third-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). To demonstrate the robustness of the association
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Appendix Fig. 1. First stage and IV point estimates in the 100 through 500 bandwidths around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. 
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reported in Tables 3–10. Variable definitions are given in Appendix Table 1, and the estimations and samples are the same as in 
Tables 3–10 except the estimation bandwidth is varied between 100 and 500 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. A 
third-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap) is included in all estimations.   
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Appendix Table 1
Variable definitions
Variable name Source Definition
R2000 Russell Investments Indicator equal to one if firm is in the Russell 2000
Mutual fund ownership % Thomson Reuters S12 files % of shares outstanding held by mutual funds in September of year t
Passive % Thomson Reuters S12 files % of shares outstanding held in September of year t by passively managed funds
Active % Thomson Reuters S12 files % of shares outstanding held in September of year t by actively managed funds
Unclassified % Thomson Reuters S12 files % of shares outstanding held in September of year t by unclassified funds
Independent director % Riskmetrics (Directors) % of board seats held by directors classified as independent by Riskmetrics
Poison pill removal Shark Repellent (FactSet) Indicator equal to one if poison pill is withdrawn or allowed to expire at time t
Greater ability to call spec. meet. Riskmetrics (Governance) Indicator equal to one if shareholders better able to call a special meeting at time t
Indicator for dual class shares Riskmetrics (Governance) Indicator equal to one if a firm has dual class shares at time t
Mngt. proposal support % Riskmetrics (Voting Results) Percentage of “Yes” votes for management proposals
Shareholder gov. prop. support % Riskmetrics (Voting Results) Percentage of “Yes” votes for shareholder governance proposals
Indicator for hedge fund activism Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) Indicator equal to one if a firm has an activism event at time t
ROA Compustat Net income (ni) / total assets (at)
Institutional ownership % Thomson Reuters 13F files % of shares outstanding held by institutional investors in September of year t
Quasi-index % Brian Bushee website % of shares outstanding held by quasi-indexer institutions in September of year t
Dedicated % Brian Bushee website % of shares outstanding held by dedicated institutions in September of year t
Transient % Brian Bushee website % of shares outstanding held by transient institutions in September of year t
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Appendix Table 2
First-stage estimation for ownership by actively managed and unclassified mutual funds
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000 0.055 0.049 0.011 0.028 0.020 0.004
(0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654
Observations 4,415 4,415 4,415 4,415 4,415 4,415
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.09
Active % scaled by its                               
sample standard deviation
Unclassified % scaled by its                               
sample standard deviation
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of ownership by actively managed and
unclassified mutual funds onto an indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional
controls over the 1998–2006 sample period. The specification is the same as in Table 3, except that the
dependent variable in columns 1–3 is now Active%it, which is the percentage of shares outstanding
owned by actively managed mutual funds for stock i at the end of September in year t scaled by its
sample standard deviation, and the dependent variable in columns 4–6 is now Unclassified%it, which is
the percentage of shares outstanding owned by unclassified mutual funds for stock i at the end of
September in year t scaled by its sample standard deviation. Both Active% and Unclassified% are
defined in Appendix Table 1.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.
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Appendix Table 3
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: First-stage estimation for Tables 4, 6, and 7
R2000 0.423*** 0.428*** 0.412*** 0.624*** 0.628*** 0.596*** 0.551*** 0.536*** 0.510***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
1st stage estimate for…
Table 4, 
Col. (1)
Table 4, 
Col. (2)
Table 4, 
Col. (3)
Table 6, 
Col. (1)
Table 6, 
Col. (2)
Table 6, 
Col. (3)
Table 6, 
Col. (4) & 
Table 7, 
Col. (1)
Table 6, 
Col. (5) & 
Table 7, 
Col. (2)
Table 6, 
Col. (6) & 
Table 7, 
Col. (3)
# Of firms 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,050 1,050 1,050
Observations 2,871 2,871 2,871 2,957 2,957 2,957 1,858 1,858 1,858
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.67
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of passive ownership onto an indicator for membership in the Russell
2000 index plus additional controls over the 1998–2006 sample period. The specification in Panel A is the same as in Table 3, but we
now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations with non-missing Riskmetrics (Directors) data on board
independence, non-missing Shark Repellent (FactSet) data on poison pills, or non-missing Riskmetrics (Governance) data on
shareholders' ability to call special meetings and dual class share structures. Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates for the IV
estimates reported in Tables 4, 6, and 7. The specification in Panel B is the same as in Table 3, but we now restrict our sample to the
smaller subsample of observations with non-missing Riskmetrics (Voting Results) data on % support for management proposals and
shareholder-intitiated governance proposals. Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates for the IV estimates reported in Table 8.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Passive % scaled by its sample standard deviation
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Panel B: First-stage estimation for Table 8
R2000 0.420*** 0.415*** 0.373*** 0.774*** 0.696*** 0.754***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.198) (0.231) (0.232)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
1st stage estimate for…
Table 8, 
Column (1)
Table 8, 
Column (2)
Table 8, 
Column (3)
Table 8, 
Column (4)
Table 8, 
Column (5)
Table 8, 
Column (6)
# Of firms 775 775 775 127 127 127
Observations 1,288 1,287 1,287 202 202 202
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.59 0.60 0.61
69
Appendix Table 4
Robustness of findings to using Russell-provided market capitalization
Dep. variable = 
Ind.              
directors        
%
Poison                  
pill                
removal
Ability to          
call special 
meeting
Ind. for              
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support % 
Gov.            
proposal 
support %
HF                 
activism 
event
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Passive % 0.487*** 0.194** 0.387*** -0.482** -0.694*** 0.287 -0.156* 0.540***
(0.147) (0.095) (0.135) (0.187) (0.237) (0.340) (0.0891) (0.133)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,082 1,164 1,050 1,050 775 127 1,654 1,600
Observations 2,871 2,957 1,858 1,858 1,288 202 4,415 4,291
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of
institutional ownership by passive investors on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we instead measure end-of-May
market caps using Russell-provided market caps for the years 2002–2006. The estimation and outcomes are the same as in Tables 4–10,
except Mktcapit is the Russell-provided end-of-May market cap of stock i in year t, except when it is missing (i.e., years 1998–2001), in
which case, we use the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t. We instrument Passive% using R2000it, an
indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a
bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a third-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). To demonstrate the
robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional controls for recent
movers, used in columns 4–6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and reported
in parentheses.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 5
Robustness of findings to using Compustat market capitalization
Dependent variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison                
pill               
removal
Ability to 
call special 
meeting
Ind. for            
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support % 
Gov. 
proposal 
support %
HF                 
activism 
event
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Passive % 0.650*** 0.176** 0.299*** -1.139*** -0.796*** 0.565* -0.134* 0.417***
(0.169) (0.073) (0.112) (0.183) (0.243) (0.294) (0.081) (0.124)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,024 1,085 992 992 733 119 1,549 1,496
Observations 2,739 2,791 1,764 1,764 1,225 191 4,171 4,052
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of
institutional ownership by passive investors on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we instead measure end-of-
May market caps using Compustat. The estimation and outcomes are the same as in Tables 4–10, except that Mktcapit is the
Compustat market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t. We instrument Passive% using R2000it, an indicator equal
to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of
250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a third-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). To demonstrate the
robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional controls for recent
movers, used in columns 4–6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and
reported in parentheses.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 6
Robustness of findings to including industry fixed effects
Dependent variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison                
pill             
removal
Ability to 
call special 
meeting
Ind. for             
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support % 
Gov. 
proposal 
support %
HF                  
activism 
event
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Passive % 0.537*** 0.182** 0.349*** -0.781*** -0.660*** 0.478 -0.161* 0.453***
(0.151) (0.0795) (0.116) (0.178) (0.230) (0.336) (0.0840) (0.122)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Two-digit industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,080 1,164 1,050 1,050 775 127 1,654 1,600
Observations 2,871 2,957 1,858 1,858 1,288 202 4,415 4,291
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of
institutional ownership by passive investors on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we add two-digit SIC industry
fixed effects. The data, outcome variables, and specification are the same as in Tables 4–10 except that we now also include two-
digit SIC industry fixed effects in the specification. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250
firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a third-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). To demonstrate the robustness
of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional controls for recent movers,
used in columns 4–6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 7
Robustness of findings to including controls for firms that recently switched indexes
Dependent variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison                 
pill                    
removal
Ability to 
call special 
meeting
Ind. for              
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support % 
Gov. 
proposal 
support %
HF                  
activism 
event
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Passive % 0.514*** 0.201*** 0.296*** -1.090*** -0.953*** 0.663** -0.287*** 0.414***
(0.170) (0.077) (0.113) (0.193) (0.250) (0.324) (0.097) (0.121)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for movers yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,080 1,164 1,050 1,050 775 127 1,654 1,600
Observations 2,871 2,957 1,858 1,858 1,288 202 4,415 4,291
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of
institutional ownership by passive investors on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we add controls to account for
firms that recently switched indexes. Specifically, the data, outcome variables, and specification are the same as in Tables 4–10
except that we now add two additional controls to the specification: an indicator that equals one for firms that are in the Russell 2000
index in year t but were in the Russell 1000 in year t-1, and an indicator that equals one for firms that are in the Russell 1000 index in
year t but were in the Russell 2000 index in year t-1. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250
firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a third-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). Standard errors, ε, are clustered
at the firm level.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 8
Robustness of findings to using only ownership of Barclays Bank, State Street, and Vanguard
Dependent variable = 
Ind.                       
directors        
%
Poison               
pill                
removal
Ability to            
call special 
meeting
Ind. for                 
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support % 
Gov.              
proposal 
support %
HF                     
activism 
event
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BSV % 0.673*** 0.249*** 0.432*** -1.293*** -0.792*** 0.838* -0.204** 0.596***
(0.159) (0.0920) (0.152) (0.262) (0.265) (0.496) (0.0967) (0.184)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,073 1,160 1,047 1,047 768 125 1,633 1,586
Observations 2,840 2,940 1,847 1,847 1,279 200 4,357 4,246
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of aggregate
institutional ownership by Vanguard, State Street, and Barclays Bank on our governance and corporate outcome variables.  Specifically, we estimate
1998–2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a third-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). To
demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional controls for recent
movers, used in columns 4–6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. The symbols *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
where: Yit is the outcome variable for firm i in year t; BSV%it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by Barclays Bank, State Street, and
Vanguard of stock i at the end of September in year t; Mktcapit is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t; Floatit is
the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t, and δt are year fixed effects. The outcome variables investigated
in this table are the same as in earlier tables, and we instrument BSV% in the above estimation using R2000it, an indicator equal to one if firm i is
part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain holdings data from Thomson
Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the
aaaaaaaaa aaaa
 
Yit =α + βBSV%it + θn Ln(Mktcapit )( )n
n=1
N
∑ + γ Ln(Float )it +δ t + ε it ,
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Appendix Table 9
Robustness of findings to using end-of-May market cap rankings to select sample
Dependent variable = 
Ind.                 
directors        
%
Poison               
pill                 
removal
Ability to            
call special 
meeting
Ind. for                 
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support % 
Gov.               
proposal 
support %
HF                     
activism 
event
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Passive % 0.448** 0.186 0.378** -1.800*** -0.748** 0.352 -0.249** 0.353**
(0.202) (0.123) (0.186) (0.366) (0.333) (0.304) (0.114) (0.175)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Two-digit industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,073 1,157 1,053 1,053 772 119 1,626 1,593
Observations 2,949 2,966 1,886 1,886 1,294 195 4,431 4,325
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional
ownership by passive investors on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we instead choose our sample using end-of-May
market cap rankings. The data, outcome variables, and specification are the same as in Tables 4–10 except that we choose our sample by
ranking stocks within a year using their end-of-May CRSP market cap and selecting our sample to only include stocks ranked 750th largest
through 1,250th largest each year. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period using a third-order polynomial control for
Ln(Mktcap). To demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the
additional controls for recent movers, used in columns 4–6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at
the firm level and reported in parentheses.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 10
Robustness of findings to including control for a firm's lagged stock return
Dependent variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison                  
pill               
removal
Ability to 
call special 
meeting
Ind. for 
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support % 
Gov. 
proposal 
support %
HF 
activism 
event
ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Passive % 0.675*** 0.209** 0.355*** -1.021*** -0.711*** 0.604* -0.160* 0.466***
(0.163) (0.0846) (0.119) (0.184) (0.268) (0.326) (0.0840) (0.128)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control for lagged stock return yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Of firms 1,075 1,111 1,046 1,046 746 126 1,537 1,483
Observations 2,856 2,855 1,850 1,850 1,252 201 4,185 4,068
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of
institutional ownership by passive investors on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we add a control to account for
a firm's stock return in the previous reconstitution year. Specifically, the data, outcome variables, and specification are the same as in
Tables 4–10 except that we add one control to the specification: the stock return in the year prior to the determination of a stock's
index assignment [i.e., from end-of-May in year t–1 to end-of-May in year t]. The model is estimated over the 1998–2006 period
using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a third-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). To
demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional
controls for recent movers, used in columns 4–6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the
firm level.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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